The Effect of Horizontal Inequity, Capacity for Budget Slack, and Severity of Peer Overstatement on Managerial Reporting Behavior by Li, Yiwen
Louisiana Tech University
Louisiana Tech Digital Commons
Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School
Summer 2018
The Effect of Horizontal Inequity, Capacity for
Budget Slack, and Severity of Peer Overstatement
on Managerial Reporting Behavior
Yiwen Li
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.latech.edu/dissertations
Part of the Accounting Commons
 
 
THE EFFECT OF HORIZONTAL INEQUITY, CAPACITY FOR 
BUDGET SLACK, AND SEVERITY OF PEER OVERSTATEMENT 
ON MANAGERIAL REPORTING BEHAVIOR 
by 







A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 







COLLEGE OF BUSINESS 












An ongoing stream of accounting research indicates that non-pecuniary factors 
significantly affect employees’ reporting behavior. This study investigates the behavioral 
effects of three non-pecuniary factors - horizontal pay inequity, capacity for budget slack, 
and severity of peer overstatement. The behaviors of interest are the employees’ level of 
honesty and whether or not they report a peer that is overstating. 
In the experiment, participants acted as division managers who request funding 
from the owner of a fictitious company to produce certain parts. In each period, 
participants were paired with a different fictitious peer and were required to make two 
decisions under a peer reporting system: (1) how much funding to request from the owner 
to complete the production task, and (2) whether to report their peers, who overstate their 
funding needs, to the owner. Participants’ total compensation was determined by their 
own decisions and the decisions made by their peers.  
The results suggest that employees are most honest about their funding requests 
when they are paid more than their peers and are least honest when they are paid less than 
their peers. Additionally, employees are most likely to blow the whistle on their peers 
who overstate their funding requests when they are paid less than their peers and are least 
likely to do so when they are paid the same as their peers. Furthermore, employees tend 




requests. Also, employees’ propensity to blow the whistle is positively associated with 
the severity of their peers’ overstatement.  
The results add to the stream of accounting research that integrates both economic 
and psychological theories to examine employees’ decision making in a multi-agent 
setting. More importantly, this study makes a contribution by testing the overpayment 
effect of horizontal inequity in an accounting setting. Also, the results enhance our 
understanding of the unintentional consequences of implementing a pay transparency 
policy. 
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 Management delegates decision rights to lower-level employees because such 
employees can use their unique and timely information regarding a firm’s daily 
operations to improve the profitability of the company as a whole (Campbell, Epstein, 
and Martinez-Jerez 2011). However, extrapolating from agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Baiman 1990), agents may use their private information to maximize 
their personal welfare when their actions are not perfectly observed by the principal. For 
example, if an agent has private information regarding the cost of producing a product, 
he/she may choose to exploit this information to the detriment of the principal. 
Accordingly, companies need formal control systems to both mitigate potential problems 
caused by information asymmetry as well as motivate employees to act in the 
organizations’ best interest.  
Many prior studies examine how various pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors 
influence employees’ reporting honesty in a single-agent, single-principal setting with the 
presence of information asymmetry (Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser 2001; Stevens 
2002; Rankin, Schwartz, and Young 2003, 2008; Hobson, Mellon, and Stevens 2011). 
However, team work and collaborative projects that require multiple employees to work 
together are becoming increasingly common. In such multi-agent settings, each 
employee’s private information may be observed or inferred by his/her coworkers and/or 
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employees from other departments due to job rotation, similar job duties, and 
collaboration in interdependent tasks (Zhang 2008). While it is typically difficult for a 
principal to observe an employee’s private information directly, the principal can elicit 
such information from that employee’s peers through a peer reporting system. A peer 
reporting system allows employees to report misconduct in the workplace to the principal 
– that is, it allows employees to “blow the whistle”. Additionally, Zhang (2008) noted 
that although a principal can elicit employees’ private information by establishing other 
formal controls (e.g., implementing an information system that reveals employees’ 
private information), the cost of employing such monitoring systems might be very high. 
Therefore, a peer reporting system can be employed to serve as an effective supplemental 
tool to control employees’ opportunistic behavior with lower cost. 
Previous research indicates that a preference for equity serves as an important 
psychological factor that impacts employees’ decision making (Luft 1997; Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999; Evans et al. 2001; Drake and Haka 2008; Zhang 2008; Matuszewski 
2010). However, few studies (Moser, Evans, and Kim 1995; Matuszewski 2010) have 
focused on the impact of horizontal inequity on reporting honesty in accounting. A 
number of studies (Clark 1958; Homans 1953; Lawler and O’Gara 1967; Scholl, Cooper, 
and McKenna 1987; Moser et al. 1995) on equity theory have documented how 
individuals resolve horizontal inequity when they are in a disadvantageous position while 
individuals’ reactions to horizontal inequity when they are in an advantageous position 
have not yet been addressed sufficiently. Specifically, most studies (Adams and 
Rosenbaum 1962; Adams and Jacobsen 1964; Friedman and Goodman 1967; Lawler, 
Koplin, Young, and Fadem 1968; Goodman and Friedman 1968) on the overpayment 
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effect manipulate horizontal inequity by challenging participants’ ability to perform 
certain tasks in experiments. However, this way of manipulation does not purely evoke 
the feeling of being over-rewarded as expected in such studies. Instead, it leads to the 
feeling of devalued self-esteem and job insecurity, which threatens the internal validity of 
those studies (Goodman and Friedman 1971; Carrell and Dittrich 1978; Sweeney 1990; 
Mowday 1991). Therefore, more research on the impacts of horizontal inequity, 
especially the overpayment effect, on employees’ decision making is needed. 
Using a multi-agent, single-principal setting, the primary goal of my study is to 
investigate how three non-pecuniary factors - horizontal inequity, capacity for budget 
slack, and severity of peer overstatement - influence employees’ degree of honesty in 
reporting and willingness to blow the whistle on peers given a peer reporting system. 
Horizontal inequity refers to a situation where the reward an individual receives is 
different from that received by a comparable referent (i.e., a fellow employee who 
performs the same work task) when they contribute the same level of input into their 
work (Adams 1963, 1965). For purposes of this study, capacity for budget refers to the 
maximum amount of budget slack an employee can create in a given situation. Severity 
of peer overstatement represents the severity of the budget slack created by an 
employee’s peer. 
First, my study is motivated by the need to explore the effect of horizontal inequity on 
employees’ reporting honesty in response to the call for more research on horizontal 
inequity mentioned above and the rising interest in pay transparency policies. Pay 
transparency policies could bring many benefits to firms, including closing the gender 
pay gap (Croson and Gneezy 2009; Eisenberg 2011; Chamberlain 2015), increasing work 
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effort and productivity (Clark, Masclet, and Villeval 2010; Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 
2011; Huet-Vaughn 2014), and achieving a higher level of job satisfaction (Lawler 1967). 
However, the adoption of a pay transparency policy may lead to unintentional negative 
consequences when a company pays employees who have the same job title and the same 
job responsibilities differently. Companies create inequity in employee payments to 
reduce salary expenses or to fulfill special contract terms. Concerns about horizontal 
inequity are raised when employees are aware of the differences between the payments 
received by them and their peers (Martin and Peterson 1987). Given the recent trends 
towards pay transparency, the effect of both underpayment and overpayment on 
employee behavior is of high research interest (Chamberlain 2015; Clabaugh 2017; 
Loudenback 2017). Based on Adams’ (1963, 1965) equity theory, employees are 
hypothesized to report their budgeted production cost most honestly when they are paid 
more than their peers and least honestly when they are paid less than their peers. Also, it 
is hypothesized that employees are more likely to blow the whistle on misreporting peers 
when they are paid less than when they are paid the same as their peers. No directional 
hypothesis regarding the overpayment effect of horizontal inequity on employees’ 
willingness to blow the whistle is proposed due to conflicting theories (Adams 1963, 
1965; Pritchard 1969; Turnley et al. 2003). 
Second, my study is motivated to evaluate how employees’ capacity for budget slack 
affects their honesty in budget reporting in a peer reporting context. The presence of 
horizontal inequity and information asymmetry introduces the incentive and opportunity 
for employees to engage in opportunistic behavior. In my study, the opportunistic 
behavior is overstating their budgeted production cost. Accordingly, controlling 
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employees’ capacity for budget slack is critical because employees are hardly able to 
engage in opportunistic activities (i.e., creating budget slack) when their ability to do so 
is constrained (Wolfe and Hermanson 2004). I predict that employees create more budget 
slack as their capacity for budget slack increases. 
Last, my study is motivated to evaluate how severity of peer overstatement affects 
employees’ willingness to blow the whistle. It is hypothesized that employees are more 
likely to blow the whistle when the budget slack created by their peer is severe than not 
severe. The examination of the effect of severity of peer overstatement on employee’s 
whistleblowing behavior is important because internal whistleblowing serves an 
important mechanism for principals to detect or prevent opportunistic behavior. 
A 3 × 2 × 2 (Horizontal Inequity × Capacity for Budget Slack × Severity of Peer 
Overstatement) experiment was conducted to test the behavioral effects of horizontal 
inequity, capacity for budget slack, and severity of peer overstatement on employees’ 
reporting behavior in a peer reporting context. The experiment lasted for ten periods. 
Participants acted as division managers who request funding from the owner/principal of 
the fictitious company to produce certain parts. In each of the ten periods, they were 
required to make two decisions under a peer reporting system: (1) how much funding to 
request from the owner to complete the production task, and (2) whether to report their 
peers, who overstate their production cost, to the owner. Their total compensation was 
determined by their own decisions and the decisions made by their peers1. Horizontal 
equity existed when participants and their fictitious peers received the same amount of 
base salary. Horizontal inequity was introduced by offering different amounts of base 
                                                 
1 Fictitious peers were used in this experiment to strengthen the experimental manipulation. 
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salary to participants and their peers. Capacity for budget slack was manipulated by 
varying the amount of funding each participant needed to produce the assigned parts each 
period. This information was known by the participant, but not the owner/principal. 
Severity of peer overstatement was manipulated by varying the amounts of budget slack 
created by participants’ peers in each period. 
The experimental results suggest that horizontal inequity significantly affects 
employees’ reporting behavior. Specifically, employees who are paid more than their 
peers are most honest with their funding requests and employees who are paid less than 
their peers are the least honest. Furthermore, employees are most likely to blow the 
whistle when they are paid less than their peers and are least likely to blow the whistle 
when they are paid the same as their peers. Additionally, employees tend to create more 
budget slack when they have greater capacity for overstating their funding requests. Also, 
employees’ propensity to blow the whistle is positively associated with the severity of 
their peers’ overstatement. 
My study contributes to the management control literatures in three broad ways. First, 
it adds to the stream of accounting research that integrates both economic and 
psychological theories to examine employees’ decision making in a multi-agent setting 
(Luft 1997; Fisher, Maines, Peffer, and Sprinkle 2002; Sprinkle 2003; Towry 2003; 
Zhang 2008; Matuszewski 2010). Specifically, my study shows the importance of the 
behavioral role of horizontal inequity, capacity for budget slack, and severity of peer 
overstatement on employees’ honesty in budget reporting and their willingness to blow 
the whistle on misreporting peers in a peer reporting setting.  
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Second, my study adds to the growing literature on Adams’ (1963, 1965) equity 
theory by comparing the different impacts horizontal inequity has on employees’ 
reporting behavior when they are paid more than their peers and when they are paid less 
than their peers in an accounting setting. More importantly, my study answers the call for 
more research on testing the overpayment effect on employees’ actions (Pritchard 1969; 
Sweeney 1990). My study is the first that I am aware of to test Adams’ (1963, 1965) 
equity theory in the area of the overpayment effect in accounting. 
Third, my study provides insights to possible unintended consequences of 
implementing a pay transparency policy in companies where employees with the same 
job title and job duty are paid differently. Horizontal inequity may result in opportunistic 
behaviors when peer reporting is not available. Results show that when the compensation 
of all individuals is visible throughout the company, employees who are paid less than 
their peers have strong incentives to restore a sense of equity by overstating their budget 
requests. Additionally, my study points out that a peer reporting system can serve as an 
effective tool for such companies that adopts a pay transparency policy to control 
employees’ opportunistic behavior. Specifically, employees tend to report opportunistic 
activities to the principal through the peer reporting system, especially for those who are 
paid less than their peers. Thus, a company having or planning to adopt a pay 
transparency policy should consider building an internal whistleblowing system if 
employees within the company are able to observe each other’s actions. Also, given that 
employees tend to create more budget slack when their capacity for budget slack 
increases, principals should implement tighter controls and broader oversight when 
information asymmetry is high.  
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The remainder of my study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes relevant 
literature on reporting honesty in managerial reporting, whistleblowing, and horizontal 
inequity. Hypotheses are developed in Chapter 3 and the research methodology is 
described in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents data analyses and experimental results. 
Chapter 6 discusses conclusions, contributions, and potential directions for future 
research. For convenience, a list of definitions common to my study is provided below. 
Definitions Used in this Study 
1. Absolute Fairness Perception – an employee’s/agent’s overall perceived fairness 
regarding the base salary he/she received. This construct was developed for 
purposes of this study. 
2. Absolute Pay Satisfaction – an employee’s/agent’s overall satisfaction regarding 
the base salary they received. This construct was developed for purposes of this 
study. 
3. Budget Slack – the difference between the actual funding needed for producing a 
product and the funding requested by an agent/employee to produce it. 
Agents/Employees may create budget slack by overstating their funding needs 
(Nikias, Schwartz, Spires, Wollscheid, and Young 2010). 
4. Budgeted Production Cost – the estimated amount of production cost predicted by 
a division’s prediction (forecasting) system. Production cost is assumed to be the 
budgeted/estimated production cost unless indicated otherwise. 
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5. Capacity for Budget Slack – the maximum amount of budget slack an 
agent/employee can create in a given situation. This construct was developed for 
purposes of this study. 
6. Conventional Economic Theory/Model (also called wealth-maximizing 
assumption) – an assumption that individuals are wealth-maximizers and they 
receive no disutility from overstating their budget reports (Evans et al. 2001). 
7. Distributional Fairness – the perceived fairness of the relative distribution of 
wealth between a principal and an agent/employee (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Falk, 
Fehr, and Fischbacher 2003; Douthit and Stevens 2015). 
8. Distributive Justice – the perceived fairness of the distribution of reward 
outcomes (e.g., salary) across agents (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001). 
9. Honesty Effect – the effect of agents’ intrinsic motivation/preference to report 
their private information honesty on their reporting behavior (Douthit and Stevens 
2015). 
10. Horizontal Inequity – a situation where the reward an individual receives is 
different from that received by a referent (i.e., a fellow employee who performs 
the same work task) when they contribute the same level of input into their work 
(Adams 1963, 1965). 
11. Input – the “investment” (e.g., work effort and education) an individual put into 
his/her job in exchange for a reward (Adams 1963, 1965). 
12. Interactional Justice – the fairness perception regarding the interpersonal 
treatment employees receive during the enforcement of organizational procedures 
(Bies and Moag 1986; Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001).  
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13. Misreporting Peer – a peer/co-worker who overstates his/her funding needs or 
budget reports. This construct was developed for purposes of this study. 
14. Opportunistic Behavior – an act or behavior where agents/employees take 
advantage of information asymmetry to pursue their self-interest at the expense of 
the principals/firms (Cohen, Holder-Webb, Sharp, and Pant 2007).  
15. Outcome – the reward an individual receives by performing his/her job (Adams 
1963, 1965). 
16. Peer Apparent Budget Slack – the amount of budget slack created by a fictitious 
peer. This construct was developed for purposes of this study. 
17. Peer Reporting System – an internal whistleblowing system that enables and 
encourages agents/employees to pass on information on peer misconduct to the 
principal (Zhang 2008). 
18. Procedural Justice – the perceived fairness of the criteria principals used to 
determine the distribution of wealth among agents and/or between principals and 
agents (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001). 
19. Reciprocity – a preference that causes individuals to repay kind acts with kindness 
and harmful acts with retribution (Falk and Fischbacher 2006; Christ 2013; 
Douthit and Stevens 2015).  
20. Relative Fairness Perception – an employee’s/agent’s perceived fairness regarding 
his/her base salary when the base salary is compared to that of his/her peer. This 
construct was developed for purposes of this study. 
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21. Relative Pay Satisfaction – an employee’s/agent’s satisfaction regarding his/her 
base salary when the base salary is compared to that of his/her peer. This 
construct was developed for purposes of this study. 
22. Reporting Honesty (also called degree of honesty in reporting) – the degree of 
truthfulness in an employee’s/agent’s budget reports or funding requests. A higher 
level of reporting honesty indicates less budget slack and less overstatement of 
funding requests. 
23. Severity of Peer Overstatement - the seriousness of the budget slack created by a 
participant’s fictitious peer. This construct was developed for purposes of this 
study. 
24. Social Norms – unwritten and informal standards that regulate social behavior 






 This chapter reviews studies in the managerial control literature as well as the 
psychology literature relevant to my study. In this regard, the chapter is organized as 
follows. First, the advantages and disadvantages of a pay transparency policy are 
described. Next, the degree of honesty in managerial reporting is discussed in terms of 
single-agent and multi-agent settings. Thereafter, the willingness of employees to blow 
the whistle on fellow employees in a peer reporting environment is delineated. Finally, 
the underpayment and overpayment effects relating to horizontal inequity are 
differentiated.  
Pay Transparency Policy 
The increasing trend of pay transparency policies has raised great attention from 
researchers (Chamberlain 2015; Clabaugh 2017; Loudenback 2017). Prior studies suggest 
that pay transparency policies help to close the gender pay gap by providing useful 
information about job positions and mitigating gender discriminations in pay (Croson and 
Gneezy 2009; Eisenberg 2011; Chamberlain 2015). Additionally, employees under a 
more transparent pay regime contribute more effort to work and achieve greater 
productivity compared to employees under a pay “secrecy” regime (Clark et al. 2010; 
Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 2011; Huet-Vaughn 2014). Also, Lawler (1967) suggest that 
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pay transparency policies may alleviate job dissatisfaction since employees tend to 
overestimate their coworker’s pay when employees have no access to their coworker’s 
pay information. 
However, implementing a pay transparency policy may cause unintentional 
negative consequences when some employees suddenly realize that they are paid less 
than their peers and/or coworkers. Under such circumstances, a pay transparency policy 
may lead to a sense of inequity (Zenger 2016). The feeling of inequity could result in 
greater job dissatisfaction, increased turnover, and reduced productivity (Zenger 2016). 
Degree of Honesty in Managerial Reporting 
Single-Agent Setting 
Many studies to date focus on a one-principal, one-agent setting in which the 
agent possesses more private information than the principal. For example, Evans et al. 
(2001) employ three experiments to examine individuals’ preferences for wealth and 
honesty in a budgeting setting. Their findings reveal a greater level of reporting honesty 
than the extent of reporting honesty predicted by conventional economic models. That is, 
individuals are willing to sacrifice part of their wealth to be honest or partially honest, 
even without contracts designed to induce reporting honesty. Furthermore, this greater 
level of reporting honesty is not affected by the size of the potential benefits that 
individuals can obtain by misreporting their private information. They also investigate 
factors that influence agents’ level of honesty. Specifically, they conclude that the 
distribution of the total profit between an agent and a firm affects an agent’s level of 
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reporting honesty. Agents report less honestly as their share of total profit reduces. 
Briefly, the results imply that agents care not only about their absolute payoff but also 
their payoff in comparison to a referent (i.e., the firm).  
Hannan, Rankin, and Towry (2006) explore the behavioral role of information 
systems on managerial reporting in an internal reporting environment. Specifically, they 
investigate how the availability and the precision of an information system influence 
agents’ trade-off between gaining social approval and increasing personal welfare by 
misreporting their private information. The results show that agents report more honestly 
when an information system that discloses an agent’s local information is available than 
when no such information system exists. Even though there is no direct monetary reward 
for agents to create less budget slack, agents choose to do so because they want to gain 
the potential benefits associated with appearing honest. That is, when the cost of 
appearing honest is relatively small, agents are willing to give up part of their economic 
benefits of misrepresenting their private information in order to create a positive 
impression and gain social approval. However, agents’ reporting honesty decreases as the 
information system becomes more precise. As the level of information asymmetry 
decreases, the marginal cost of appearing honest to the same extent increases. Under such 
circumstances, agents are less willing to give up the benefits of misreport. As a result, 
their reporting honesty is higher under a coarse information system than under a precise 
information system. This study suggests that the effectiveness of a firm’s information 
system in encouraging managerial honesty is sensitive to the precision of the information 
system. In other words, agents report more (less) honestly when the control/information 
system allows them to create more (less) budget slack.  
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Douthit and Stevens (2015) examine how distributional affect honesty effects2 in 
a participative budgeting setting. The results show that honesty effect on budgetary slack 
diminishes when the effect of distribution fairness gets stronger. Specifically, an agent 
report less honestly to achieve an equitable allocation of payoffs between the agent and 
the principal. This study suggests that agents’ fairness perception regarding their payoff 
in comparison to that of their referent (i.e., the principal/firm) has a strong impact on 
reporting honesty in managerial reporting. 
Multi-Agent Setting 
In practice, incentive systems and participative budgeting always involve multiple 
agents/groups. In turn, there has been an increase in accounting research regarding 
decision-makings in multi-agent environments. For example, Towry (2003) investigates 
the effectiveness of two financial incentive systems on controlling agents’ opportunistic 
behavior in the context of joint production of a single product. One of the incentive 
systems is a vertical incentive system, which relies on the assumption that members on 
the same team can observe each other’s actions. Under the vertical incentive scheme, 
agents report their peers’ performance directly to the principal, and they are paid based 
on their own performance and the report filed by their teammate. The vertical incentive 
system is essentially a peer reporting system. The results demonstrate that the 
effectiveness of the vertical incentive system is determined by the level of team identity, 
which is positively associated with team cooperation. Specifically, a high level of team 
identity degrades the effectiveness of the vertical incentive scheme because team 
                                                 
2 Honesty effects refer to the effect of individuals’ intrinsic motivation to be honest/ truthful on their 
budgeting reports (Douthit and Stevens 2015) 
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members could engage in collusive behavior by covering up for each other, which in turn 
leads to a low level of work effort. The results indicate that psychological factors (e.g., 
team identity) can influence the effectiveness of a peer reporting system in controlling 
team performance and agents’ opportunistic behavior.  
Zhang (2008) tests how fairness perception and inter-agent communication 
influence employees’ reporting behavior and collusion under a peer reporting system. 
The results suggest that agents reveal their private cost information more honestly and are 
more likely to blow the whistle on misreporting peers when their wage is perceived as 
fair compared to when their wage is perceived as unfair3. Additional analyses suggest that 
communication among agents significantly affects agents’ reporting behaviors only when 
the wage they received from the principal is perceived as unfair. Specifically, agents 
increase their engagement in collusion, overstate their budgeted production cost to a 
greater extent, and blow the whistle less frequently when their wage is perceived as 
unfair. Inter-agent communication does not have significant effect on agents’ reporting 
honesty or whistleblowing behavior when their wage is perceived as fair4. Overall, the 
results demonstrate that fairness perception regarding agents’ absolute wage can greatly 
influence the effect of a peer reporting system on honesty and collusion in managerial 
reporting. 
                                                 
3 In Zhang’s (2008) experiment, agents perceive their wage to be fair when they receive a higher amount of 
wage (1,000 Lira) from the principal and unfair when they receive a lower amount of wage (500 Lira) from 
the principal. Participants and their peers receive the same amount of wage from the principal in each 
period. 
4 In Zhang’s (2008) research setting, the principal is perceived to be fair if he/she choose to pay the agents 
1000 Lira instead of 500 Lira. The principal is perceived to be unfair if he/she choose to pay the agents 500 
Lira instead of 1000 Lira. 
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Matuszewski (2010) examines whether changes in salary and horizontal equity 
affect individuals’ trade-off between wealth and honesty. She finds that change in 
perceived horizontal equity of salary affect agents’ reporting behavior in budget 
reporting. Agents’ reactions to restoration of horizontal equity are different when 
horizontal equity is rebuilt by increasing their own salaries than by decreasing their 
peers’ salaries. Specifically, restoring horizontal equity by increasing one’s own salary 
leads to significantly greater change in honesty than restoring horizontal equity by 
decreasing the salary of his/her peer. However, agents’ responses to the introduction of 
horizontal inequity are almost the same no matter if horizontal equity is decreased 
through reducing their own salaries or through increasing their peers’ salaries.  
Carpenter, Robbett, and Akbar (in press) examine the complementary effect of 
peer reporting and profit sharing on agents’ opportunistic behaviors. Their experimental 
evidence shows that peer reporting alone does not greatly motivate agents to work harder. 
However, agents’ productivity increases when a profit sharing pay scheme is combined 
with the peer reporting system. Although the reward obtained from profit sharing may not 
be sufficient for agents to highly increase their productivity, a profit sharing incentive 
scheme is strong enough to motivate them to increase their wealth by reporting free riders 
to the principal when peer reporting is possible. Under such circumstances, rational 
agents would choose to devote more effort to their work to avoid being reported or 
punished. Overall, the results demonstrate that financial incentive schemes (e.g. profit-
sharing) can affect employees’ wiliness to blow the whistle and the effectiveness of a 
peer reporting system.  
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Willingness to Blow the Whistle 
Internal misconduct could cause a firm to experience serious economic losses and 
continues to be a major concern for employers. In contrast, internal whistle blowing 
serves as an important mechanism for employers to detect or prevent fraud and/or other 
misconduct within an organization (Stikeleather 2016). However, employees’ willingness 
to report wrongdoing within an organization is somewhat regulated by group norms 
(Feldman 1984). Peer reporting is discouraged in groups with strong cohesion because it 
could be treated as a violation of social norms that support in-group loyalty. As a result, a 
peer reporter might receive some form of group punishment such as ostracism and 
expulsion (Greenberger, Miceli, and Cohen 1987; McCabe, Trevino, and Butterfield 
2001). Although group loyalty might constrain individuals’ willingness to blow the 
whistle, there are various factors that could increase their inclinations to report their 
peers’ misconduct. 
First, perception of fairness influences employees’ willingness to report others’ 
wrongdoing to the principal (Victor et al. 1993; Seifert, Sweeney, Joireman, and 
Thornton 2010; Seifert, Stammerjohan, and Martin 2014). Peer reporting is generally 
treated as an extra-role behavior when it is not mandatory. When employees feel 
exploited by the organization, they may consider their relationship with the organization 
as a pure economic exchange relationship. In this case, employees would be reluctant to 
offer additional assistance to the organization. On the contrary, when employees think the 
organization is being fair, they are more likely to perceive themselves and the 
organization in a social exchange relationship. Accordingly, employees would 
reciprocate this perceived fairness by taking extra-role responsibilities such as reporting 
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others’ misconduct to the organization (Victor et al. 1993; Seifert et al. 2010; Seifert et al. 
2014). Research results (Trevino and Victor 1992; Victor, Trevino, and Shapiro 1993; 
McCabe, Trevino, and Butterfield 2001) show that when employees believe that it is their 
responsibility to monitor and report misconduct, they are more inclined to blow the 
whistle on their peers. Furthermore, previous research (Greenberg 1990; Miceli and Near 
1992; Near, Dworkin, and Miceli 1993; Trevino and Weaver 2001; Scott, Colquitt, and 
Zapata-Phelan 2007; Zhang 2008; Seifert et al. 2010; Seifert et al. 2014) demonstrates 
that distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice5 with respect to the 
whistleblowing process are positively associated with employees’ propensity to report 
their supervisor’s misconduct. Similarly, Victor et al. (1993) concludes that one’s 
willingness to engage in peer reporting increases as distributive justice (pay equity) 
and/or procedural justice increase. Also, they suggest that an employee with stronger 
desire for retributive justice6 is more likely to report his/her peer’s misconduct. 
Second, individuals are more likely to report opportunistic behavior in the 
workplace when rewards are provided (McCabe et al. 2001). Rewards for whistleblowing 
could signal the employees that whistleblowing is expected and motivate employees to 
report workplace issues (Xu and Ziegenfuss 2008). Additionally, Dyck, Morse, and 
Zingales (2010) conduct an archival study on corporate fraud, and they suggest that 
monetary rewards could be a strong incentive for employees to blow the whistle on 
corporate fraud.  
                                                 
5 Distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of the distribution of reward outcomes (e.g., salary) 
across agents, procedural justice emphasizes the perceived fairness of the criteria principals used to 
determine the distribution of wealth among agents and/or between principals and agents, and interactional 
justice reflects the fairness perception regarding the interpersonal treatment employees receive during the 
enforcement of organizational procedures (Bies and Moag 1986; Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001). 
6 Retributive justice reflects the perceived fairness of punishment for misconduct in the workplace (Victor 
et al. 1993). 
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Third, employees are more likely to report their peers’ wrongdoing when they 
benefit from blowing the whistle financially. Under these circumstances, group members 
may consider peer reporting as a way of protecting their own interest and they are more 
likely to engage in mutual monitoring and peer reporting (Trevino and Victor 1992; 
Victor et al. 1993; Welbourne, Balkin, and Gomez-Mejia 1995). For example, Carpenter 
et al. (in press) demonstrate that team members working under a profit-sharing incentive 
scheme are more likely to report their peers’ wrongdoing than team members working 
without a profit-sharing plan.  
Finally, whistleblowing is more likely to occur when the misconduct is severe 
(Miceli and Near 1985). The more serious the misconduct is, the more likely such act is 
to be judged as wrongful. Also, whistleblowers are more likely to gain support from 
senior managers when the reported misconduct is more severe.   
Horizontal Inequity 
People have a preference for equity (Adams 1963, 1965; Austin and Walster 
1974; Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman 1989). As previously suggested, the study 
of justice or equity categorizes organizational justice into three groups: (1) distributive 
justice, (2) procedural justice, and (3) interactional justice. Specifically, distributive 
justice refers to the perceived fairness of the distribution of reward outcomes (e.g., salary) 
across agents (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001). Procedural justice emphasizes the 
perceived fairness of the criteria principals used to determine the distribution of wealth 
among agents and/or between principals and agents (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, 
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and Ng 2001). Interactional justice refers to the fairness perception regarding the 
interpersonal treatment employees receive during the enforcement of organizational 
procedures (Bies and Moag 1986). My study only focuses on the effects of distributive 
justice. 
Adams (1963, 1965) uses social exchange theory to define inequity. He (1965, p. 
280) asserts that inequity exists when an individual “perceives that the ratio of his 
outcome to inputs and the ratio of Other’s outcome to Other’s inputs are unequal.” 
Outcomes represent the reward an individual receives by performing a job, such as wages 
and fringe benefits. Inputs refer to the contribution an individual contributes to the job, 
such as education and physical effort. Other (a referent) could be any person or group that 
an individual chooses to compare his/her own outcome-to-input ratio with. Generally, an 
individual and his/her referent have one or more comparable attributes. Individuals 
usually compare themselves with their co-workers or peers (Adams 1963, 1965). 
Following prior research (Moser et al. 1995; Kim, Evans, and Moser 2005; Matuszewski 
2010), I use the term horizontal inequity to describe the inequitable scenarios defined by 
Adams (1963, 1965) and horizontal inequity is summarized in the next paragraph.  
Horizontal inequity may occur when an individual and his/her referent are in a 
direct exchange relationship as well as when both the individual and the referent are in a 
direct exchange relationship with a third party (Adams 1963, 1965). Horizontal inequity 
exists not only when an individual is relatively underpaid7 than his/her peers, but also 
when he/she is relatively overpaid then his/her peers. However, the threshold for 
                                                 
7 In my study, an individual/employee is said to be underpaid (overpaid) when he/she receives lower 
(higher) payment compared to his/her peer who contributes similar level of input into work. 
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perceptions of horizontal inequity is higher when an individual is relatively over-
rewarded than under-rewarded because overpayment could be rationalized as good 
fortune (Adams 1963, 1965). The presence of horizontal inequity leads to unpleasant 
emotional states including dissatisfaction, anger, and guilt (Adams 1963, 1965). 
Additionally, the presence of horizontal inequity creates tension in an individual that 
drives him/her to take actions to reduce the feeling of inequity and/or to reestablish the 
feeling of equity. The motivation to reduce inequity gets stronger when the magnitude of 
inequity gets larger. An individual can reduce the feeling of inequity by (1) changing 
his/her own inputs or outcomes, (2) altering the referent’s inputs and outcomes, (3) 
cognitively distorting his/her or the referent’s inputs and outcomes, (4) changing the 
referent, and/or (5) leaving the field or forcing the referent to leave the field. 
Underpayment Effect 
The predictions derived from equity theory in the area of the underpayment effect 
have received substantial support from previous studies. For example, Homans (1953) 
interviews two types of clerical workers, cash posters and ledger clerks, in a utility 
company. The job of a cash poster is simple and repetitive, while ledger clerks have to 
perform multiple complicated tasks and put more time and effort into their jobs. Although 
the ledger clerks contribute more inputs than the cash posters, their weekly pay (outcome) 
is identical. That is, compared to the cash posters, the ledger clerks are being underpaid. 
The results show that 75% of ledger clerks express a feeling of inequity and an 
expectation of increasing their weekly salary. However, the ledger clerks do not take real 
actions to reduce inequity.   
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Clark (1958) interviews cashiers and bundlers (who help customers to put 
groceries into shopping bags) in grocery stores. Cashiers generally get higher salaries, 
enjoy higher status, but have a lower education level. On the contrary, bundlers are those 
with higher educational background but are paid less. When the bundlers perceive that 
they are underpaid, they reduce inequity by reducing their inputs in the form of slowing 
up the bundling process. 
Lawler and O’Gara (1967) provide another test on Adams’ (1963, 1965) equity 
theory. In their experiment, subjects are hired as interviewers and are paid 10¢ 
(underpaid) or 25¢ (equitably paid) for each interview. According to the results, subjects 
who are paid 10¢ per interview think their outcome-to-input ratio is lower than that of the 
equitably paid subjects, and they are inclined to conduct more interviews but spend less 
time on each interview. That is, underpaid subjects reduce inequity by increasing 
outcomes (total pay) without increasing inputs (time). 
Scholl et al. (1987) tests individuals’ behavioral responses to the presence of 
inequity. Perceptions of inequity are measured by participants’ self-reported information. 
The results show that job equity8 could influence employees’ willingness to engage in 
extra-role behaviors that could bring benefits to an organization. Specifically, underpaid 
employees are less likely to help others with problems or give employers suggestions for 
improvement. That is, an individual will reduce his or her inputs when his/her co-worker 
earns more.  
                                                 
8 Job equity measures an individual’s equity perception driven by the comparison with other individuals 
doing the same job in the same organization (Scholl et al. 1987).  
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Moser et al. (1995) examines how the underpayment effect of horizontal inequity 
affects individuals’ decision-making in a tax reporting context. Participants in the 
horizontal equity (inequity) condition face the same (a higher) tax rate as (than) other 
taxpayers. Based on the experimental results, disadvantageous horizontal inequity results 
in decreased level of honesty in tax reporting.  
Overpayment Effect 
Although the underpayment aspect of Adams’ (1963, 1965) equity theory has 
received a good deal of support, the research results regarding the predictions of the 
overpayment effect are unclear. Adams and Rosenbaum (1962) conduct two experiments 
to test the overpayment effect. In the first experiment, subjects were hired as temporary 
interviewers, and they were paid $3.5 per hour. Half of the subjects were told that they 
were not qualified for performing the interviewing task but they were still paid at a rate a 
qualified interviewer would be paid. Accordingly, those subjects were assumed to be 
overpaid. The other half of the subjects was told that they were qualified for the job and 
were paid equitably. As predicted, overpaid subjects increased their productivity (input) 
by conducting more interviews than equitably paid subjects as a means of reducing 
inequity. In the second experiment, subjects were paid on a piece-rate basis. In this case, 
overpaid subjects decreased their productivity (output) in order to achieve a feeling of 
equity.  
However, the difference in subjects’ behaviors can be interpreted by alternative 
explanations (Pritchard 1969; Andrews and Valenzi 1970; Wiener 1970; Goodman and 
Friedman 1971; Carrell and Dittrich 1978; Mowday 1991). First, the perception of 
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overcompensation is induced by challenging subjects’ qualification for the job. 
Therefore, it is highly possible that subjects who were told that they were unqualified for 
the job improve their job performance in order to prove that they are capable of doing this 
job rather than to reduce the feeling of inequity. To illustrate in detail, in the first 
experiment, given that subjects are compensated on a per hour basis, “conducing a large 
number of interviews could be seen as doing a good job” (Pritchard 1969, p. 187). 
Therefore, overpaid subjects might increase their productivity to convince themselves 
that they are not poor interviewers. In the second experiment, since subjects are paid on a 
piece-rate basis, conducting a small number of completed interviews could be considered 
as an effort subjects take to do a good job. That is, an overpaid subject might spend more 
time on each interview task to show he “conducted the interviews with a great deal of 
care and hence would not bias his employer’s data” (Pritchard 1969, p. 187). Second, 
since overpaid subjects are told they are unqualified for the job, they have strong 
incentives to work harder to secure their job rather than to reduce the feeling of inequity 
(Pritchard 1969; Wiener 1970; Goodman and Friedman 1971; Carrell and Dittrich 1978; 
Mowday 1991).  
A variety of studies on the overpayment effect (Adams and Jacobsen 1964; 
Friedman and Goodman 1967; Lawler et al. 1968; Goodman and Friedman 1968) use 
similar methods to investigate the relationship between horizontal inequity and job 
performance. The overpayment manipulation is similar to that used in Adams and 
Rosenbaum’s (1962) study. Although the results seemingly support the prediction that 
overpaid subjects raise their inputs and/or reduce their outputs to reduce the feeling of 
inequity, the validity of the conclusions are impaired by the contaminating effects of 
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lowered self-esteem and perceived job insecurity (Pritchard 1969; Wiener 1970; 
Goodman and Friedman 1971; Carrell and Dittrich 1978; Mowday 1991). Therefore, it is 
possible that overpaid subjects in those experiments modify their inputs and/or outputs to 
obtain confidence in their own ability rather than to restore equity. 
Andrews (1967) examines Adams’ (1963, 1965) theory of inequity in a different 
way. Subjects are hired to interview students or check data. Perceived inequity is induced 
by varying the level of pay (low vs. equitable vs. high) each subject receives. In this way, 
the potential contaminant effect of self-esteem is excluded. Based on the predictions of 
Adams’ (1963, 1965) equity theory, underpaid (overpaid) subjects should be more (less) 
productive compared to equitably paid subjects. However, the results only show strong 
support for the underpayment effect. There is no significant difference in the level of 
work output achieved by the overpaid group and the equitably paid group. In other words, 
overpaid subjects do not behave consistently with the Adams’ (1963, 1965) predictions. 
Similarly, other studies (Evan and Simmons 1969; Valenzi and Andrews 1971) that 
operationalize inequity by means other than challenging subjects’ competence only 
support the predictions of equity theory on the underpayment effect but fail to support the 
overpayment effect.   
Sweeney (1990) tests the overpayment and the underpayment effect on pay 
satisfaction by conducting three surveys. Horizontal inequity is measured by directly 
asking participants to make a fairness judgment regarding their income relative to the 
referents. The results suggest that people are most satisfied when horizontal equity is 
achieved and that people are significantly less satisfied when they are underpaid. 
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Although overpaid participants report a lower level of satisfaction compared to equitably 
paid participants, the difference is not significant. 
Gino and Pierce (2009) conduct two experiments to investigate how perceptions 
of horizontal inequity influence individuals’ likelihood of dishonestly helping or hurting 
others. Participants were randomly assigned the role of a grader or a solver. Solvers were 
required to complete an anagram task and graders are required to grade their paired 
solver’s task9. Horizontal inequity was manipulated by varying the initial compensation 
each participant receives. Specifically, each participant’s initial compensation is 
determined by flipping a coin. In the first experiment, a solver receives additional 
compensation by achieving the goal of creating 10 words from series of letters provided 
in each round, and a grader receives additional compensation if the paired solver reaches 
the goal. In the second experiment, a grader will lose part of the additional compensation 
if the paired solver reaches the goal in each round. The results show that underpaid 
graders are more likely to underreport solvers’ performance intentionally, even when 
such hurting behavior requires personal financial cost. On the contrary, overpaid graders 
tend to engage in more helping behavior by overstating graders’ performance, even if the 
helping behavior demands additional cost. Although the overall result is consistent with 
Adams’ (1963, 1965) propositions, the conclusion cannot be generalized to my study 
because the underpaid participants and the overpaid participants in this study Gino and 
Pierce (2009) did not perform the same type of task. 
                                                 
9 Unlike other studies, underpaid participants and overpaid participants in this study did not perform the 
same type of task. 
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To summarize, although the hypotheses developed from the underpayment effect 
of Adams’ (1963, 1965) equity theory are supported by various studies, the research 
results regarding the prediction derived from the overpayment effect are controversial 
due to the serious criticism most studies received regarding their way of manipulation the 
overpayment effect. Therefore, further study is needed to obtain a better understanding of 
the effect of horizontal inequity, especially the overpayment effect. In response to the call 
for more research in this area, my study examines the effect of horizontal inequity on 
employees’ reporting behavior in a common context of interest to accountants - a 







Several prior studies (Moser et al. 1995; Zhang 2008; Matuszewski 2010; Seifert 
et al. 2010; Seifert et al. 2014; Douthit and Stevens 2015) demonstrate that psychological 
factors such as equity and fairness perceptions could affect employees’ reporting 
behavior in different accounting settings. However, only a few studies (Moser et al. 1995; 
Matuszewski 2010) have focused on the impact of horizontal inequity on reporting 
honesty in accounting. Research in the area of horizontal inequity typically concentrates 
on exploring the behavior of employees that are paid less than comparable peers (Clark 
1958; Homans 1953; Lawler and O’Gara 1967; Scholl et al. 1987; Moser et al. 1995). 
Given that research on the behavior of employees that are paid more than comparable 
peers has received less attention (Pritchard 1969; Sweeney 1990), further study is needed 
to better understand how horizontal inequity, in the form of overpaid employees, 
influences reporting behavior in a peer reporting context. In this regard, my study 
investigates how horizontal inequity, capacity for budget slack, and severity of peer 
overstatement influence employees’ degree of honesty and their willingness to report 
misreporting peers when a peer reporting system is employed. My experiment is 
conducted in a budgeting context, a common context of interest to accountants. Thus, my 
study provides additional insights regarding the overpayment effect in an accounting 
setting. This chapter starts with an overview of the peer reporting system employed in 
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this study and, thereafter, the hypothesized predictions regarding employees’ decision 
making under this peer reporting system are presented. 
Peer Reporting in a Budgeting Reporting Context 
The experiment employed in my study is developed from the peer reporting 
system research design employed in Zhang (2008). In particular, participants assumed the 
role of a division manager. In this regard, they were responsible for producing parts in 
each period and were told that another division manager within the same company was 
doing the same job. Additionally, participants were required to make two sequential 
decisions. In the first stage, participants needed to request funding from the owner to 
produce a certain amount of a part. Due to information asymmetry, the owner only knew 
the distribution of each division’s production cost but didn’t know the actual amount of 
the production cost. Participants might receive additional compensation by overstating 
their production cost (which created budget slack). In the second stage, after submitting 
their funding request to the owner, participants were shown the amount of funding 
requested by the other division manager. Since participants and their peers were 
producing the same part, their actual production costs were very similar. Participants 
were required to indicate whether their peers overstated the production cost or not. If 
participants blow the whistle on their peers who were guilty of overstating the production 
cost, they received a reporting reward. However, if participants falsely accused their 
peers, the participants received nothing in that period. As for the division managers 
whose overstatement was reported by their peers, they were charged a penalty and they 




Based on conventional economic models (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Baiman 
1990), individuals make reporting decisions to maximize their own wealth. Since no 
communication between division managers is allowed under the peer reporting system 
employed in my study, it is unlikely for managers to increase their total compensation by 
overstating their funding needs and then covering for each other. In such circumstances, a 
wealth-maximizer should always be willing to turn in his/her misreporting peers to obtain 
the reporting reward. Assuming that the other manager will behave in a similar manner 
(i.e., report a misreporting peer), a “rational” manager would choose to report honestly in 
the first stage to avoid the potential penalty associated with being reported. Given the 
limited ability to collude, rational managers will always report their budgeted production 
cost honestly to the owner in the first stage and truthfully inform the owner that their 
peers did not overstate the budgeted production cost in the second stage, regardless of 
their preferences for horizontal equity. This wealth-maximizing assumption suggests that 
whether a manager’s relative compensation is equitable to that of his/her peer is not 
relevant to either of their two decisions (Zhang 2008). Thus, the conventional economic 
model predicts complete honesty given the context of a peer reporting system that 
includes a reward for whistleblowing and a penalty for being “caught” misreporting. 
However, previous research (e.g., Evans et al. 2001; Rankin et al. 2003; Hobson et al. 
2011; Fisher et al. 2002; Stevens 2002; Zhang 2008; Matuszewski 2010; Douthit and 
Stevens 2015) has documented that various non-pecuniary factors (e.g., perception of pay 
equity) other than conventional pecuniary incentives significantly affect employees’ 
reporting behavior and the effectiveness of managerial control systems.  
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To gain additional insights in these areas, my study investigates how three non-
pecuniary factors – horizontal inequity, capacity for budget slack, and severity of peer 
overstatement – affect employees managerial reporting under the peer reporting system10 
described above. To begin with, I address the hypotheses related to the impact of 
horizontal inequity on honesty in budget reports, which are stated in H1a and H1b. 
Thereafter, the hypothesis related to the impact of the underpayment effect of horizontal 
inequity on employees’ whistleblowing decisions is stated in H2a and the impact of the 
overpayment effect on employees’ whistleblowing decisions is stated in H2b. Finally, 
H3a is based on the notion that employees’ opportunistic behavior can be controlled by 
limiting their ability to commit such actions and H3b is motivated by the notion that 
employees’ willingness to blow the whistle on misreporting peer is associated with the 
severity of their peers’ overstatement of budgeted production cost. 
The Effect of Horizontal Inequity on Reporting Honesty 
 As noted earlier, Adams’ (1963, 1965) equity theory suggests that individuals 
compare their outcome11 to input12 ratio to that of a referent person or group to determine 
whether they are treated equitably. An equitable state is present when individuals 
perceive that their own outcome-to-input ratio is the same that of their referents – 
typically, their co-workers. Following prior studies (Moser et al. 1995; Kim et al. 2005; 
Matuszewski 2010), I call this equitable state “horizontal equity”. In contrast, horizontal 
inequity exists when an individual’s outcome-to-input ratio is different from that of the 
                                                 
10 Specific descriptions of the peer reporting system in my experiment is discussed in Chapter 4. 
11 Outcome refers to the reward an individual receives by performing his/her job (Adams 1963, 1965). 
12 Input refers to the “investment” (e.g., work effort and education) an individual put into his/her job in 
exchange for a reward (Adams 1963, 1965). 
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referent, no matter whether the individual is in an advantageous position (paid more than 
his/her peer) or in a disadvantageous position (paid less than his/her peer). In my research 
design, participants were told that they have the same level of work experience and 
educational background, as well as the same job description and workload as their peers. 
Therefore, in my study, the inputs that participants and their peers allocate to their tasks 
were set at the same level across all conditions. In contrast, the base outcomes (i.e., base 
salary) they received were different. Specifically, horizontal inequity is introduced by 
providing different levels of base salary to participants and their peers.  
 Assuming that pay transparency exists, those who are paid more than their 
comparable peers and those who are paid less than their comparable peers may both have 
a feeling of inequity. In turn, the presence of horizontal inequity results in emotional 
distress and dissatisfaction, which motivates individuals in an inequitable state to take 
actions to reestablish the state of equity by: (1) changing their own inputs or outcomes, 
(2) altering the referents’ input or outcome, and/or (3) quitting the job (Adams 1963, 
1965). For example, employees who receive a relatively lower base salary are in a 
disadvantaged position that urges them to engage in opportunistic behaviors such as 
reducing effort (decreasing personal input) and stealing from the company (increasing 
personal outcome) (Scholl et al. 1987; Greenberg 1990). Furthermore, employees who 
feel underpaid might justify opportunistic behaviors (for instance, misreporting their 
private information) as less unethical (Greenberger et al.1987; Greenberg 1990). 
Moreover, when employees feel they are being exploited by the principal, they tend to 
consider their relationship with the organization as a pure economic exchange 
relationship. Under such circumstances, they are strongly influenced by pecuniary 
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incentives and thus are more likely to engage in short-term behaviors that jeopardizes a 
company’s wealth (Shore and Tetrick 1994; Victor et al. 1993; Seifert et al. 2010; Seifert 
et al. 2014). Taken together, employees who are in a disadvantaged position could choose 
to alleviate their feeling of inequity by increasing their personal welfare, even at the 
expense of the firm. With respect to my research setting, employees who are paid less 
than their peers are more likely to take risks to overstate their budgeted production costs 
to increase their total compensation. 
 Employees are most comfortable when they are paid the same as their peers 
(Austin and Walster 1974; Sweeney 1990). Employees perceive a principal as fair when 
they receive equitable payments, which could encourage them to reciprocate the principal 
by being honest (Zhang 2008). Additionally, when employees are treated fairly by an 
organization, they are more likely to define their relationship with the organization as a 
social exchange relationship rather than an economic exchange relationship (Seifert et al. 
2010; Seifert et al. 2014). Taken together, employees who are paid the same as their peers 
are more inclined to exhibit a higher level of honesty compared to those who are paid less 
than their peers, as there is no need to try to “establish” equity. That is, in my experiment, 
participants who are paid the same as their peers are expected to report their budgeted 
production cost to the principal more honestly than participants who are paid less than 
their peers. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1a: Employees who are paid the same as their peers will report their budgeted 
production cost more honestly than employees who are paid less than their peers. 
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 As for employees who are paid more than their peers, they may choose not to 
obtain any additional compensation (such as by creating budget slack) as a means of 
mitigating the feeling of inequity. In addition, based on psychological contract theory 
(Shore and Tetrick 1994; Kickul and Lester 2001; Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler 2002), 
employees perceive that there is a reciprocal obligation between their employer and 
themselves, and they attempt to keep an equitable balance between the reward they 
receive from the organization and the contributions they devote to the company. 
Therefore, employees try their best to avoid a feeling of indebtedness to their exchange 
partner (Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler 2002; Turnley, Bolino, Lester, and Bloodgood 2003). 
That is, when employees think that the organization provides more rewards or salary than 
expected, they might treat the overpayment as a future obligation and try to reciprocate 
by bringing future benefits to the firm to repay the psychological debt. To summarize, 
employees receiving a greater amount of base salary than their peers may have much 
stronger incentives to report their budgeted production cost honestly to avoid inequity or 
psychological indebtedness. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1b: Employees who are paid more than their peers will report their budgeted production 
cost more honestly than employees who are paid the same as their peers. 
The Effect of Horizontal Inequity on Whistleblowing Behavior 
 For employees who are paid the same as their peers, their willingness to blow the 
whistle may be constrained by group norms and the threat of retaliation (Feldman 1984; 
Greenberger et al. 1987; McCabe et al. 2001). On the other hand, Adams’ (1963, 1965) 
equity theory suggests that when negative horizontal inequity occurs, attempts such as 
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increasing one’s own outcome or reducing the referents’ outcome will be made to 
achieve a sense of equity. Under the peer reporting system in my experimental setting, 
employees who are paid less than their peers can chose to blow the whistle on their 
misreporting peers to restore a feeling of equity. Specifically, by doing so, they can 
increase their final compensation through the reporting reward and reduce their peers’ 
final compensation through the penalty system. Also, a strong perception of inequity is 
associated with anger, dissatisfaction, and resentment (Adams 1963, 1965; Austin and 
Walster 1974; Sweeney 1990), which in turn could reduce an employee’s in-group 
loyalty and increase his/her desire for revenge by reporting their peers’ wrongdoing to the 
principal. Taken as a whole, employees who are paid less than their peers have both 
psychological and economic motivations to blow the whistle on their misreporting peers. 
It is predicted that employees are more willing to blow the whistle when they are paid 
less than their peers compared to when they are paid the same as their peers. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
H2a: Employees who are paid less than their peers are more likely to blow the whistle on 
their misreporting peers compared to employees who are paid the same as their peers. 
 With regard to employees who are paid more than their peers, the perception of 
inequity could produce feelings of guilt, and they might feel sorry for their peers (Austin 
and Walster 1974; Gino and Pierce 2009). Gino and Pierce (2009) suggest that the 
distressed mental states caused by horizontal inequity drives employees who are paid 
more to dishonestly help their peers who are paid less to get more reward, even at their 
own financial cost. Hence, combining their propositions (Gina and Pierce 2009) with 
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Adams’ (1963, 1965) equity theory, employees who are paid more tend to cover up their 
peers’ wrongdoing, even if they will lose the reporting reward by doing this. 
However, Pritchard (1969) proposes different predictions from Adams’ (1963, 
1965) equity theory regarding the overpayment effect. Specifically, if an individual feels 
relatively over-rewarded by a third party, “he should make no attempts to change his own 
inputs or outcomes, nor feel dissatisfied when comparing his ratio with someone has the 
same inputs as he does, but lower outcomes” (Pritchard 1969, p. 209). That is, when the 
reward each employee receives is determined by a third party (the principal), an 
employee who receives more payment than his/her peer does not need to be dissatisfied. 
More importantly, although employees who are paid more than their peers may feel the 
distribution of the payment is unfair, they may not engage in any behavior that changes 
the situation because they are not responsible for it. 
Pritchard’s (1969) propositions are also consistent with the self-serving bias 
theory (Miller and Ross 1975; Bradley 1978; Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, and Hankin 
2004) that individuals tend to attribute positive outcomes to their own ability while 
attribute negative outcomes to external factors (such as the principal and/or the 
organization). Accordingly, when an employee receives a higher amount of base salary 
than his/her referent, he/she may find reasons to justify the overpayment. Employees who 
are paid more could attribute the overpayment to good fortune and/or a reward to their 
superior ability. One of Pritchard’s (1969) propositions is supported by a field study 
suggesting that the level of satisfaction reported by employees who are paid more is not 
significantly different from employees who are paid equitably (Sweeney 1990). Besides, 
when employees receive more rewards than expected, they may feel they owe future 
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obligations to the organization in return (Turnley et al. 2003). Therefore, they are more 
likely to take on extra responsibilities to support the organization, such as informing the 
principal of any misconduct identified within the organization.  
To summarize, there are competing predictions on the whistleblowing decisions 
of employees who are paid more than their peers. Thus, a non-directional hypothesis is 
proposed: 
H2b: There is a difference in willingness to blow the whistle on misreporting peers 
between employees who are paid more than their peers and employees who are paid the 
same as their peers. 
The Effect of Capacity for Budget Slack on Reporting Honesty 
I now address how capacity for budget slack affects the level of honesty in 
employees’ budget reports. In my experimental setting, the possibility of increasing 
personal income provides employees financial incentives to misreport their private 
information (e.g., overstating their funding needs). Furthermore, employees, especially 
those who are paid less than their peers, may not view the overstatement of their funding 
needs as unethical (Greenberger et al. 1987; Greenberg 1990). In addition, the presence 
of information asymmetry provides employees the opportunity to increase their financial 
gains by overstating their funding needs without being discovered (that is, if not reported 
by their peers). In other words, employees could increase their final compensation by 
overstating more funding needs (if not reported by their peers). Also, employees can 
overstate their funding needs to a greater extent as their capacity for budget slack 
increases. In summary, employees’ motivation and ability to overstate their funding 
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needs increases as they have greater capacity to create budget slack. Thus, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H3a: Employees tend to create more budget slack as their capacity for overstating 
budgeted production cost increases.  
The Effect of Severity of Peer Overstatement on Whistleblowing Behavior 
Then I address how severity of peer overstatement affects employees’ willingness 
to blow the whistle on misreporting peers. Dyck et al. (2010) conduct an archival study to 
investigate the key incentives for employees to blow the whistle on opportunistic 
activities in the workplace and suggest that monetary incentives serve as a strong 
motivation for “people with information to come forward” (Dyck et al. 2010, p. 2215). In 
my experimental design, the monetary reward for blowing the whistle is higher when the 
perceived severity of peer’s overstatement is greater. Miceli and Near (1985) also 
document that organization members are more likely to blow the whistle if the 
wrongdoing is obvious and that opportunistic behaviors are more likely to be judged as 
wrongful when they are severe. Additionally, companies and principals are more likely to 
support their employees who blow the whistle if the opportunistic behaviors they reported 
are severe. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3b: Employees are more likely to blow the whistle as the severity of their peer’s 




To summarize, I predict that employees are most honest when they are paid more 
than their peers and are least honest when they are paid less than their peers. 
Additionally, employees who are paid less than their peers are more likely to blow the 
whistle when those who are paid the same as their peers. Furthermore, employees are 
expected to create more budget slack when they have greater capacity for overstating 
their budgeted production cost. Also, employees’ propensity to blow the whistle is 
expected to be positively associated with the severity of their peers’ overstatement. The 
methodology employed to address the hypotheses proposed in this chapter is provided in 








I conducted a mixed 3 x 2 x 2 experiment to test my hypotheses. Each 
experimental session consisted of ten periods. The first factor, horizontal inequity, is a 
between-subjects factor with three levels. It was manipulated by varying the amounts of 
base salary participants and their peers received. Three scenarios were used to 
operationalize horizontal inequity: an overpaid scenario, an equitably paid scenario, and 
an underpaid scenario13. Participants were randomly assigned to one of these three 
scenarios.  
The second factor, capacity for budget slack, is a within-subjects factor and has 
two levels, large and small. It was manipulated by providing different amounts of actual 
production cost to participants in each of the ten periods.  
The third factor, severity of peer overstatement14, is a within-subjects factor and 
has two levels, severe and not severe. It was manipulated by varying the amounts of 
budget slack created by participants’ peers in the ten periods. To summarize, each 
participant was assigned to only one of the three horizontal inequity scenarios, but each 
                                                 
13 In my study, overpaid (underpaid) denotes that employees are paid more (less) than their peers. 
Similarly, equitably paid denotes that employees are paid the same as their peers. 
14 Capacity for budget slack is paired with horizontal inequity to test H3a, and severity of peer 
overstatement is paired with horizontal inequity to test H3b. 
42 
 
participant was exposed to every condition of capacity for budget slack and severity of 
peer overstatement. The main dependent variables include participants’ level of honesty 
in reporting production costs and their propensity to blow the whistle on peers that 
overstated their production costs.  
Participants were students primarily recruited from upper level business 
undergraduate courses from a public university in the United States. Since no special 
accounting knowledge or experience is required to complete the experimental tasks, this 
subject pool is considered appropriate for this study. Participants were paired with 
different fictitious peers in each of the ten periods. The purpose of using different 
fictitious peers in each period is to strengthen the experimental manipulation of severity 
of peer overstatement and reduce carry over effects15. To avoid deception, participants 
were informed that the experiment used a scenario and at no time were the participants 
led to believe their peers were other participants.  
In each period, participants learned their own funding needs16 and requested 
funding from the owner. They also learned the amount of funding requested by their peer 
after they had submitted their funding request for the period. Based on the information 
they were given, they were required to make two reporting decisions: (1) how much 
funding to request from the owner, and (2) whether or not to report that their peer had 
overstated their funding needs. 
                                                 
15 To ensure that participants experience the same amounts of misreporting over the 10 periods, fictitious 
peer managers are used. Also, matching participants with a new fictitious peer in each period minimizes the 
possibility that participants’ decisions are affected by the decisions made by themselves and their peers in 
prior periods. 
16 To enhance clarity and minimize complexity, the term “funding needs” was used in lieu of “production 
cost” in the experimental instrument. Production cost is assumed to be the budgeted/estimated production 




Participants acted as the manager of Division A of a fictitious company (Beta 
Company). The company produces multiple parts for the auto industry and has multiple 
divisions. Participants and a fictitious division manager17 within the same company were 
responsible for producing the same part in each of the ten periods. In each period, 
participants were paired with a different fictitious manager and were required to produce 
a different part with a different production cost. The managers of each division knew the 
actual amount of their own production cost18 through a private forecasting system while 
the owner of the company only knew the possible range of the production cost, which lay 
between 3,000 Lira19 and 4,000 Lira, in increments of 50 Lira. Upon learning their true 
production cost, participants’ first task was to request funding from the owner to produce 
the part. In the scenario, participants were told that the owner did not know the actual 
production cost, and as described below, they can increase their personal compensation 
by overstating their production cost.  
The company had a peer reporting system that aimed to control division 
managers’ overstatement of their true production cost. Since both the participant and the 
other peer manager were responsible for producing the same part in each period, the 
actual production cost of these two divisions was very similar. That is to say, participants 
                                                 
17 The fictitious division manager(s) is denoted as (fictitious) peer(s). 
18 For experimental control and data analysis purposes, participants were told to assume that the 
estimated/budgeted production cost (a.k.a., “funding needs”) provided by the production cost prediction 
(forecasting) system was the same as the actual production cost (i.e., the actual funding needs). Admittedly, 
in practice, the predicted production cost is usually different from the actual production cost. However, the 
assumption that the predicted and the actual production cost were the same was necessary to enhance 
internal validity and enable data analysis. Specifically, overstatement of production cost is used to measure 
reporting honesty. 
19 Lira is the currency used in the experiment. 
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can use the information regarding their own production cost to determine if their peer was 
overstating his/her true production cost. After independently requesting funding from the 
owner, each division manager was shown the amount of funding his/her peer requested to 
produce the same part. In the peer reporting system, each participant was required to 
inform the owner whether the other manager overstated his/her production costs or not.  
In each period, managers received a fixed base salary for performing their tasks. 
If a division manager overstated the production cost and was not reported by his/her peer, 
he/she would get the requested amount of funding from the owner and keep the 
overstatement as additional compensation. However, if the participant overstated the 
production cost and was reported by his/her peer20, the owner would only provide 
funding that is sufficient for making the product to the overstating manager. Additionally, 
the misreporting manager reported by his/her peer was charged a penalty for misreporting 
and the manager who blew the whistle on his/her misreporting peer received a reporting 
reward. Unlike Zhang’s (2008) design, the incentive system in this experimental design 
set both the reporting reward and the penalty as 20% of the overstatement of the 
misreporting manager rather than a fixed amount. In summary, a manager’ final payment 
was based (1) on his/her own decisions and (2) potentially on the decision of his/her peer. 
In addition, participants who falsely accused their peers receive no payment in that 
period. 
                                                 
20 If a participant overstated his/her funding needs, there was a 20% chance that the participant would be 
“reported” by his/her fictitious peer. Participants were not told that there was specifically a 20% chance of 
being reported by the fictitious peer. This experimental design choice was made to induce a context where 




This experiment was conducted via computer with the use of z-Tree software 
(Fischbacher 2007). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three horizontal 
inequity treatments:  the overpaid treatment, the equitably paid treatment, and the 
underpaid treatment. Multiple experimental sessions that took 60 – 90 minutes were 
conducted for each treatment. Upon arriving at the experimental session, each participant 
was randomly assigned to a computer and asked to read and sign a consent form 
(Appendix B). At the start of each session, participants were asked to assume the role of a 
division manager and were told all the information collected during the session would be 
kept confidential. The program displayed a set of instructions (Appendix D) that 
explained their tasks and how they would be compensated on the screen. A printed 
version of the instructions was provided as well. To help participants understand the 
procedures and the pay calculations, several examples (Appendix E) and practice 
questions (Appendix F) were provided. After reading the examples and completing the 
practice questions, participants took a quiz (Appendix H) to test their understanding of 
the experimental context. Participants could not proceed to the next stage unless they 
answered all the questions correctly.  
After successfully completing the quiz, participants received a summary of the 
key information related to the task and the amount of base salary the participant and 
his/her peer were received (Appendix I). To further evaluate participants’ comprehension 
of the task and the compensation system, several manipulation check questions and 
comment sections were included in the post-experiment questionnaire (Appendix N). 
Participants then performed one practice round to get familiar with the task. Specifically, 
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the program explained the numbers on the Private Forecasting Information Form 
(Appendix J) and the other division’s (peer’s) Funding Request Form (Appendix L) and 
how to use their own division’s Funding Request Form (Appendix K) and the Peer 
Reporting Form (Appendix M).  
 The experiment lasted for 10 periods and each participant can proceed at his/her 
own pace. At the beginning of each period, participants were informed that they would 
produce a different part and the actual production cost of the new part would be different 
compared to the actual production cost in other periods. Also, they would be matched 
with a different manager (peer) from another division within the same company in the 
new period. Additionally, at the beginning of each period, participants were required to 
type in the amount of base salary they and their peer received.  Next, they checked the 
private forecasting information form to determine the actual production cost and then 
chose the amount of funding to request from the owner. The program then displayed the 
other manager’s funding request form. At this point, participants learned the amount of 
funding requested by their peer and decided whether or not to report the other manager’s 
overstatement to the owner. The next period began after a 5-second waiting phase. To 
conclude the experiment, participants were required to complete a post-experiment 
questionnaire, which collected demographic information, measured their personality traits 
(i.e., vertical individualism, horizontal collectivism, risk aversion, and idealism) and their 
fairness perception and satisfaction toward their base salary.  
Participants were not allowed to talk with each other during the experiment at any 
time. An experimenter was available to answer any questions they had during the 
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experiment. The screen of each participant displayed his/her final payment after the post-
experiment questionnaire was completed. Participants were paid in cash. 
Independent Variables 
The three independent variables in this study are horizontal inequity, capacity for 
budget slack, and severity of peer overstatement. Similar to Matuszewski (2010), 
horizontal inequity was operationalized by varying the difference between a manager’s 
base salary and his/her peer’s base salary. Participants in all conditions were informed 
that they and their peers had the same level of work experience, educational background, 
job description and workload. In the overpaid condition, participants were told that their 
base salary was higher than their peers’ base salary. Specifically, while their peers 
received a base salary of 400 Lira, participants received a base salary of 800 Lira, which 
was twice as high as their peer’s base salary. In the equitably paid condition, participants 
were told that their base salary was the same as their peers’ base salary, which was 600 
Lira. In the underpaid condition, participants were told that their base salary was lower 
than their peers’ base salary. Specifically, while their peers received a base salary of 800 
Lira, they received a base salary of 400 Lira, which was only half of their peer’s base 
salary. To solidify the manipulation, participants in the overpaid and underpaid 
treatments were required to calculate their final payment when their base salary was 400 
Lira and when was 800 Lira before they learned their base salary (Appendix F)21. In that 
way, participants got a clear understanding of how different amount of base salary 
                                                 
21 In the equitably paid condition, participants learned their base salary before reading the examples. In 
contrast, in the overpaid and underpaid conditions, participants learned their base salary (Appendix G) after 
completing the practice questions. 
48 
 
affected their final payment. Those participants could only learn their and the other 
manager’s base salary after they correctly answered all the practice questions. 
 Capacity for creating budget slack is defined as the maximum amount of budget 
slack an employee can create by requesting more funding than needed. Since the owner 
only knew the range of each division’s production cost was between 3,000 Lira and 4,000 
Lira, participants had the opportunity to obtain more income by misreporting their 
funding needs (if they are not reported by the other manager). In each period, the level of 
capacity for budget slack was manipulated by altering the amount of actual production 
cost showed to participants through the private forecasting system. Table 1 summarizes 
the combinations of the actual production cost and the amount of funding requested by 
the fictitious peer throughout the ten periods. The sequence of the ten combinations for 
each participant was randomized to control for order effects. Given that capacity for 
budget slack is a within-subjects variable, each participant made decisions in both 
conditions (large capacity vs. small capacity). In the large capacity condition, the actual 
production cost for each division ranged from 3,050 Lira to 3,250 Lira, which left plenty 
of room for participants to overstate their funding needs. In the small capacity condition, 
the actual production cost ranged from 3,650 Lira to 3,850 Lira, which left little room for 
























Severity of Peer 
Overstatementd 
Large 3,050 950 3,850 800 High 
Large 3,150 850 3,150 0 N/A 
Large 3,200 800 3,350 150 Low 
Large 3,100 900 3,900 800 High 
Large 3,250 750 3,400 150 Low 
Small 3,700 300 4,000 300 High 
Small 3,650 350 3,950 300 High 
Small 3,850 150 3,850 0 N/A 
Small 3,750 250 3,900 150 Low 
Small 3,800 200 3,950 150 Low 
a. Capacity for Budget Slack = 4,000 Lira – Actual Production Cost 
b. The amount of funding requested by the fictitious peer. 
c. Budget slack created by the fictitious peer = funding requested by the fictitious peer 
minus actual production cost. 
d. Peer overstatement is denoted as not severe when the budget slack created by the 
fictitious peer is 150, severe otherwise. 
 
In this experiment, the severity of peer overstatement is determined by the amount 
of budget slack created by each participant’s fictitious peers. Specifically, it is calculated 
as the difference between the amount of actual production cost and the amount of funding 
requested by the fictitious peer. Peer overstatement is not severe when the budget slack 
created by the fictitious peer is less than 300 Lira, and severe otherwise (Table 1)22. 
Dependent Variables 
The first main dependent variable is the degree of reporting honesty, and it is 
measured in two ways. The first measure is simply the budget slack, which is the 
                                                 




difference between the amount of funding requested by the participant and the actual 
amount of funding needed. A higher amount of budget slack indicates a lower degree of 
reporting honesty. The second measure, used by Evans et al. (2001), is percentage of 
honesty. It is calculated as 1 – budget slack/slack available, where slack available is the 
difference between the maximum amount of production cost and the actual amount of 
funding needed. A higher percentage represents a greater level of reporting honesty. 
The second main dependent variable is employees’ willingness to blow the 
whistle. Following Towry (2003) and Zhang (2008), it is measured as the percentage of 
whistleblowing. Specifically, it is calculated as the number of times a participant blew the 
whistle divided by the number of times the participant was paired with a misreporting 
peer. A higher percentage of whistleblowing indicates greater willingness to blow the 
whistle. 
Control Variables 
 Previous research (Ford and Richardson 1994) indicates that an individual’s 
decision-making is affected by his/her innate personality traits. Accordingly, I put a series 
of questions in the post-experiment questionnaire (Appendix N) to measure each 
participant’s personality traits that might affect participants’ behavior in my experimental 
context. First, I followed Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, and Gelfand (1995) to measure 
vertical individualism and horizontal collectivism. Vertical individualism emphasizes 
self-interests while horizontal collectivism focuses on group harmony (Singelis et al. 
1995). Employees with a high level of individualism are expected to be more likely to 
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overstate their budgeted production cost and blow the whistle in order to obtain more 
wealth. On the contrary, employees with a high level of horizontal collectivism are 
expected to be less likely to overstate their budgeted production cost because they 
prioritize group goals over personal goals. Second, I used Mandrik and Bao’s (2005) 
scale to assess risk aversion, which stands for individuals’ preference for riskless 
outcomes. Individuals who tend to be risk averse are expected to be less likely to 
overstate their budgeted production cost for fear of being caught. Third, idealism that 
stands for one’s “sensitivity to wrongdoing” and “attitudes toward peer reporting as an 
appropriate response to the unethical behavior of peers (Barnett, Bass, and Brown 1996, 
p. 1164)” is expected to be positively associated with employee’ reporting honesty. I 
followed Forsyth’s (1980) scale to measure ethical ideology. 
 Based on prior literature (Zhang 2008; Seifert et al. 2010; Seifert et al. 2014), 
employees’ fairness perception and satisfaction may affect their decisions (i.e., how much 
funding to request from the owner and whether or not to blow the whistle). Also, 
individuals in a positive mood are more likely to engage in cooperative behaviors than 
those in a negative mood (Isen and Levin 1972; Miceli and Near 1988). Therefore, I 
developed three items to measure participants’ perceived fairness regarding the base 
salary they received in the experiment and three items to measure their satisfaction 
regarding their base salary (Appendix N). 
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Payments to Participants 
One of the 10 periods was randomly selected to be the payment period. 
Participants received a cash payment at the rate of one dollar for each 100 Lira they 
earned. Participant’s total payoff ranged from $3.00 to $19.00. On average, participants 








EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  
 This chapter presents the experimental results. First, an overview of the 
sample/participants is provided. The next section presents the main analyses of the 
hypotheses. The final section discusses the control variables and the ANCOVA tests.  
Participants 
 Participants were 120 students primarily recruited from upper level business 
undergraduate courses from a public university in the United States23. This subject pool is 
judged appropriate for this study, given that no special accounting knowledge or 
experience is required to complete the task. On average, participants spent 60 – 90 
minutes on completing the study and earned $7. Seventy-seven participants (64%) were 
male and forty-three participants were female (36%). The participants had an average age 
of 21 and their mean work experience was 1.8 years. The majority of the participants 
(82%) were business students and the remaining participants came from other majors 
such as aviation management and engineering. Thirty-nine participants were in the 
                                                 
23 A total of 148 students participated in the study. Twenty-eight participants who did not pass the 
manipulation check or indicated they did not understand the compensation system or the task were removed 
from the analyses. Participants who requested funding that was lower than the actual cost were kept if they 
stated a very specific strategy in the post-experiment questionnaire. Deleted participants were not 
concentrated in one treatment. 
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overpaid treatment, forty-one participants were in the underpaid treatment, and forty 
participants were in the equitably paid treatment. 
Table 2 shows that no participant created budget slack to the maximum amount 
constantly throughout the experiment. In the underpaid condition, there were three 
(7.32%) participants who never created any budget slack, one (2.44%) participant who 
blew the whistle on their misreporting peers persistently, and no participant who never 
blew the whistle. In the overpaid condition, there were seven (17.95%) participants who 
never created any budget slack, two (5.13%) participants who blew the whistle on their 
misreporting peers persistently, and one (2.56%) participant who never blew the whistle. 
In the equitably paid condition, there were six (15.00%) participants who never created 
any budget slack, three (7.50%) participants who persistently blew the whistle on their 
misreporting peers, and one (2.50%) participant who never blew the whistle. 







 Create Budget 
Slack to the 
Maximum 
Amount 






Underpaid  3  0  1  0 
 (7.32%)  (0.00%)  (2.44%)  (0.00%) 
Overpaid  7  0  2  1 
 (17.95%)  (0.00%)  (5.13%)  (2.56%) 
Equitably Paid  6  0  3  1 
  (15.00%)  (0.00%)  (7.50%)  (2.50%) 
This table shows the number (percentage) of participants who create no budget slack, 
who create budget slack to the maximum amount, who always blow the whistle on lying 




Tests of Hypotheses 
The Effects of Horizontal Inequity on Budget Slack (H1a and H1b) 
 H1a predicts that employees report their budgeted production cost more honestly 
when they are paid the same as their peers than when they are paid less than their peers. 
Table 3 and Figure 1 summarize the descriptive statistics for budget slack by each 
horizontal inequity condition. Consistent with H1a, average budget slack was lower when 
participants received the same amount of base salary as their peers (99.38) than when 
participants received less base salary (119.63). H1b predicts that employees report their 
cost more honestly when they receive more base salary than when they receive the same 
base salary as their peers. Table 3 and Figure 1 also show that, on average, budget slack 
was lower when participants were paid more (83.21) compared to when they were paid 
the same as their peers (99.38). In total, average budget slack was lowest in the overpaid 
condition and was highest in the underpaid condition, which is consistent with the 
predictions. 
 

















Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (Mean, {Standard Deviation}, n) of Budget Slack 
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{167.59} 
n = 600  
{82.14} 
n = 600  
{134.95} 
n = 1,200 
Budget slack = the amount of funding requested by an employee minus the actual 
amount of funding needed. 
 
 Table 4 reports the conventional analysis of variance (ANAVA) results with 
Horizontal Inequity and Capacity for Budget Slack as independent variables and Budget 
Slack as the dependent variable. Panel A of Table 4 shows that the amount of budget 
slack was significantly influenced by horizontal inequity (F = 7.76, p < 0.01, two-tailed). 
The interaction effect between horizontal inequity and capacity for budget slack was 
insignificant (F = 1.47, p = 0.23, two-tailed). Panel B of Table 4 reports comparisons of 
each horizontal inequity condition. Specifically, budget slack was significantly lower in 
the equitably paid condition than the underpaid condition (p = 0.01, one-tailed). Also, 
participants created significantly less amount of budget slack in the overpaid condition 




Table 4: Effects of Horizontal Inequity and Capacity for Budget Slack on Budget Slack 
(ANOVA) 
Dependent Variable = Budget Slack (n = 1,200) 
 
Panel A: Main Effects 
 
Source  df  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2  7.76  0.00 
Capacity for Budget Slack  1  56.03  0.00 
Horizontal Inequity × Capacity 
for Budget Slack 
 2  1.47  0.23 
 
Panel B: Hypothesis Tests 
 
Hypothesis  Prediction  p-value 
(one-tailed) 
 Conclusion 
H1a  Equitably Paid < Underpaid  0.01  Supported 
H1b  Overpaid < Equitably Paid  0.04  Supported 
H3a  Small Capacity < Large Capacity  0.00  Supported 
Budget slack = the amount of funding requested by an employee minus the actual 
amount of funding needed. 
 
I used a linear mixed model to test the effect of horizontal inequity on the amount 
of budget slack created by employees as a robust test. The linear mixed model controls 
for the random effect varies across different participants due to repeated observations. 
Precisely, the random effect is associated with the special characteristics related to each 
participant that cannot be explained by the manipulated treatments (Majors 2016). Panel 
A of Table 5 shows the results. The main effect of horizontal inequity on the amount of 
budget slack participants created was significant (F = 2.53, p =0.05, one-tailed) and the 
interaction effect between horizontal inequity and capacity for budget slack was not 
significant (F = 1.25, p = 0.13, one-tailed). Combining the statistical results with the 
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descriptive statistics, participants were most likely to report their budgets honestly when 
they were paid more than their peers and were least likely to do so when they were paid 
less than their peers. Taken together, both H1a and H1b are supported.  
 
Table 5: Effects of Horizontal Inequity and Capacity for Budget Slack on Reporting 
Honesty (Linear Mix Model) 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Budget Slack (n = 1,200) 
 
Source  F-Value  p-value 
(one-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2.53  0.05 
Capacity for Budget Slack  21.90  0.00 
Horizontal Inequity × Capacity 
for Budget Slack 
 1.25  0.13 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Percentage of Honesty (n = 1,200) 
 
Source  F-Value  p-value 
(one-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2.53  0.05 
Capacity for Budget Slack  35.40  0.00 
Horizontal Inequity × Capacity 
for Budget Slack 
 0.67  0.20 
Budget slack = the amount of funding requested by an employee minus the actual 
amount of funding needed. 
Percentage of Honesty = 1 – Budget Slack/Slack Available, where Slack Available is 
the difference between the maximum amount of production cost and the actual amount 
of funding needed. 
 
 
To further demonstrate robustness, contrast coding was employed to test H1a and 
H1b. Contrast weights were +1 in the underpaid condition, -1 in the overpaid condition, 
and 0 in the equitably paid condition. The planned contrast was significant (Panel A of 
Table 6, F =13.38, p < 0.01, two-tailed). This finding suggests that employees create the 
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most amount of budget slack when they are paid more than their peers and the least 
amount of budget slack when they are paid less than their peers, supporting H1a and H1b. 
 
Table 6: Effects of Horizontal Inequity on Reporting Honesty (Contrast Model) 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Budget Slack 
 
Source  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
     
Horizontal Inequity  13.38  0.00 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Percentage of Honesty 
     
Source  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
     
Horizontal Inequity  14.15  0.00 
Budget slack = the amount of funding requested by an employee minus the actual 
amount of funding needed. Contrast weights are +1 in the underpaid condition, -1 in 
the overpaid condition, and 0 in the equitably paid condition. 
Percentage of Honesty = 1 – Budget Slack/Slack Available, where Slack Available is 
the difference between the maximum amount of production cost and the actual 
amount of funding needed. Contrast weights are -1 in the underpaid condition, +1 in 
the overpaid condition, and 0 in the equitably paid condition. 
 
The Effects of Horizontal Inequity on Percentage of Honesty (H1a and H1b) 
As a robustness check, I used the percentage of honesty as a different measure for 
employees’ reporting honesty to test the hypotheses as well. H1a and H1b predict that 
employees are most honest when they are paid more than their peers and least honest 
when they are paid less than their peers. Table 7 and Figure 2 report descriptive statistics 
and Table 8 shows the results of the ANOVA analysis (with Percentage of Honesty as the 
dependent variable) and the post hoc analysis. Table 8, Panel A shows that horizontal 
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inequity significantly affected participants’ reporting honesty (F = 7.88, p < 0.01, two-
tailed). No significant interaction effect between horizontal inequity and capacity for 
budget slack was identified (F = 0.80, p = 0.45, two-tailed). 
 































Table 7: Descriptive Statistics (Mean, {Standard Deviation}, n) of Percentage of 
Honesty 
     
Capacity for Budget Slack 
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n = 1,200 
Percentage of Honesty = 1 – Budget Slack/Slack Available, where Slack Available is 
the difference between the maximum amount of production cost and the actual amount 















Table 8: Effects of Horizontal Inequity and Capacity for Budget Slack on Percentage of 
Honesty (ANOVA) 
Dependent Variable = Percentage of Honesty (n = 1,200) 
 
Panel A: Main Effects 
 
Source  df  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2  7.88  0.00 
Capacity for Budget Slack  1  89.19  0.00 
Horizontal Inequity × Capacity 
for Budget Slack 
 2  0.80  0.45 
 
Panel B: Hypothesis Tests 
 
Hypothesis  Prediction  p-value 
(one-tailed) 
 Conclusion 
H1a  Underpaid < Equitably Paid  0.03  Supported 
H1b  Equitably Paid < Overpaid   0.01  Supported 
H3a  Small Capacity > Large Capacity  0.00  Not 
supported 
Percentage of Honesty = 1 – Budget Slack/Slack Available, where Slack Available is 
the difference between the maximum amount of production cost and the actual amount 
of funding needed. 
 
Individual comparisons among the three conditions (overpaid, equitably paid, and 
underpaid) are presented in Panel B of Table 4. Specifically, participants’ percentage of 
honesty was significantly higher when they were paid the same as their peers compared 
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to when they were paid less than their peers (0.77 vs. 0.73, p = 0.03, one-tailed). Also, 
their percentage of honesty was significantly lower when they were paid the same as their 
peers compared to when they were paid more than their peers (0.77 vs. 0.81, p = 0.01, 
one-tailed). Taken together, H1a and H1b are supported.  
The results of a linear mix model test (see Panel B of Table 5) provide additional 
support for my hypotheses. Consistent with the results of the ANOVA test, participants’ 
degree of reporting honesty was significantly affected by horizontal inequity (F = 2.53, p 
= 0.05, one-tailed). Additionally, the interaction effect between horizontal inequity and 
capacity for budget slack was not significant (F = 0.67, p = 0.20, one-tailed). Combined 
with the descriptive statistics, the results suggest that employees are most honest when 
they are paid more than their peers and are least honest when they are paid less than their 
peers.  
Table 6 provides the results of the planned contrast analyses to test H1a and H1b 
when percentage of honesty was used to measure participants’ degree of honesty. 
Contrast weights were +1 for the underpaid condition, -1 for the overpaid condition, and 
0 for the equitably paid condition. As shown in Panel B, the planned contrast was 
significant (F = 14.15, p < 0.01, two-tailed), indicating that employees are most honesty 
in the overpaid condition and least honest in the underpaid condition, which is consistent 
with H1a and H1b. 
The Effects of Horizontal Inequity on Willingness to Blow the Whistle (H2a and H2b) 
H2a predicts that employees who are paid less than their peers are more likely to 
blow the whistle than employees who are paid equitably. Following Zhang (2008) and 
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Towry (2003), I used the percentage of whistleblowing as the dependent variable to test 
H2a. Table 9 and Figure 3 reports the average percentage of whistleblowing for each 
horizontal inequity condition, suggesting the average percentage of whistleblowing is 
higher in the underpaid condition (0.62) than the equitably paid condition (0.56).  
 


























Table 9: Descriptive Statistics (Mean, {Standard Deviation}, n) of Willingness to blow 
the whistle (Percentage of Whistleblowing) 
     
Severity of Peer Overstatement 
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    n = 120  n = 120  n = 240 
Percentage of Whistleblowing = the percentage of truthful whistleblowing on lying 
peers. 
 
Panel A of Table 10 provides the results of an ANOVA test on Individual 
Whistleblowing Percentage as dependent variable and Horizontal Inequity and Severity 
of Peer Overstatement as independent variables. No significant main effect of horizontal 
inequity on individual whistleblowing percentage was detected (F = 1.36, p = 0.26, two-
tailed). Given that ANOVA is less powerful for testing the effect of a treatment when the 
treatment has more than two levels (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990; Drake, Haka, and 
Ravenscroft 1999), a post hoc analysis was conducted. Based on the individual 
comparison analyses provided by Panel B of Table 10, participants’ willingness to blow 
the whistle on their misreporting peers was significantly greater when they were paid less 
than their peers compared to when they were paid the same as their peers, which is 
consistent with H2a.  
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Table 10: Effects of Horizontal Inequity and Severity of Peer Overstatement on 
Whistleblowing Behavior (ANOVA) 
Dependent Variable = Individual Whistleblowing Percentage (n = 240) 
 
Panel A: Main Effects 
 
Source  df  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2  1.36  0.26 
Severity of Peer Overstatement  1  249.35  0.00 
Horizontal Inequity × Severity 
of Peer Overstatement 
 2  0.15  0.86 
 
Panel B: Hypothesis Tests 
 
Hypothesis  Prediction  p-value 
(one-tailed) 
 Conclusion 
H2a  Underpaid > Equitably Paid  0.05  Supported 
H3b  Not Severe < Severe  0.00  Supported 
H2b  Equitably Paid vs. Overpaid  0.28   
Percentage of Whistleblowing = the percentage of truthful whistleblowing on lying 
peers. 
 
H2b considers whether employees are more or less likely to blow the whistle on 
opportunistic behavior when they are paid more than their peers compared to when they 
are paid the same as their peers. Descriptive statistics in Table 9 suggest that participants 
who were paid more than their peers were more likely to blow the whistle than those who 
were paid the same as their peers (0.58 vs. 0.56). However, the percentage of 
whistleblowing in the overpaid treatment was not significantly different than that in the 
equitably paid treatment (Table 10, p = 0.28, one-tailed).  
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I also ran a repeated-measure ANOVA24 with Whistleblowing Percentage as the 
dependent variable, Horizontal Inequity as the between-subject independent variable, and 
Severity of Peer Overstatement as the within-subject independent variable. Similar to the 
main result, the main effect of horizontal inequity on participants’ whistleblowing 
behavior was insignificant (Table 11, Panel A, p = 0.33, two-tailed). Further analysis 
conducted by the post hoc tests reveal that participants’ willingness to blow the whistle 
on their misreporting peers was significantly higher in the underpaid condition than the 
equitably paid condition (Table 11, Panel B, p = 0.07, one-tailed). That is, H2a is 
supported. Nevertheless, as for H2b, no significant differences between participants who 
were paid more and those who were paid the same was detected (Table 11, Panel B, p = 




















                                                 
24 A repeated-measure ANOVA helps to control individual differences among subjects (Howell 2012). 
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Table 11: Effects of Horizontal Inequity and Severity of Peer Overstatement on 
Whistleblowing Behavior (repeated-ANOVA) 
Dependent Variable = Individual Whistleblowing Percentage (n = 240) 
 
Panel A: Main Effects 
 
Source  df  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2  1.11  0.33 
Severity of Peer Overstatement  1  321.35  0.00 
Horizontal Inequity × Severity 
of Peer Overstatement 
 2  .198  0.82 
 
Panel B: Hypothesis Tests 
 
Hypothesis  Prediction  p-value 
(one-tailed) 
 Conclusion 
H2a  Underpaid > Equitably Paid  0.07  Supported 
H3b  Severe < Not Severe  0.00  Supported 
H2b  Equitably Paid vs. Overpaid  0.30   
A repeated ANOVA test is conducted with Individual Whistleblowing Percentage as 
the dependent variable, Horizontal Inequity as the between-subject independent 
variable, and Severity of Peer Overstatement as the within-subject independent 
variable. 
 
Given that ANOVA only detects significant differences among treatments rather 
than significant patterns within different treatments, prior research (Buckless and 
Ravenscroft 1990; Drake et al. 1999) suggests that ANOVA is more powerful for testing 
hypotheses when the independent variables has no more than two levels. Since 
Horizontal Inequity is a three-level variable and no significant main effect of horizontal 
inequity on individual whistleblowing percentage was detected, contrast coding is more 
appropriate to test the ordinal effect of horizontal inequity. Specifically, contrast weights 
were +1 in the underpaid condition, 0 in the overpaid condition, and -1 in the equitably 
paid condition. As shown in Table 12, the planned contrast was insignificant (F = 1.48, p 
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= 0.11, one-tailed). Follow-up simple effects tests show that the planed contrast was 
insignificant (F = 1.41, p = 0.12, one-tailed) when the misreporting peer’s overstatement 
was severe or when the overstatement was not severe.  
Table 12: Effects of Horizontal Inequity on Whistleblowing Behavior (Contrast Model) 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Individual Whistleblowing Percentage 
 
Source  F-Value  p-value 
(one-tailed) 
     
Horizontal Inequity  1.30  0.13 
 
Panel B: Simple Effect when Peer Overstatement is Not Severe 
     
Source  F-Value  p-value 
(one-tailed) 
     
Horizontal Inequity  1.46  0.12 
     
Panel C: Simple Effect When Peer Overstatement is Severe 
     
Source  F-Value  p-value 
(one-tailed) 
     
Horizontal Inequity  1.22  0.14 
Percentage of Whistleblowing = the percentage of truthful whistleblowing on 
lying peers. Contrast weights are +1 in the underpaid condition, 0 in the overpaid 
condition, and -1 in the equitably paid condition. 
 
 
I ran a cross-tabulation test as additional analysis. Based on the statistical results 
in Panel A of Table 13, no significant association between horizontal inequity and 
participants’ whistleblowing decision was identified (chi-square = 2.08, p = 0.35, two-
tailed). Similarly, no significant simple effect of horizontal inequity on participants’ 
whistleblowing decisions was detected when peer overstatement was not severe (Panel B 
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of Table 13, chi-square = 2.13, p = 0.34, two-tailed) or when peer overstatement was 
severe (Panel C of Table 13, chi-square = 1.76, p = 0.42, two-tailed). 
Table 13: Cross-Tabulation Analysis 
Panel A: Effects of Horizontal Inequity on Whistleblowing Behavior  
  Whistleblowing Decision  χ2  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
  Yes  No     
Overpaid  182  208  2.08  0.35 
  (46.7%)  (53.3%)     
Equitably Paid  179  221     
  (44.8%)  (55.2%)     
Underpaid  204  206     
  (49.8%)  (50.2%)     
 
Panel B: Effects of Horizontal Inequity when Peer Overstatement is Not Severe 
  Whistleblowing Decision  χ2  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
  Yes  No     
Overpaid  48  185  2.13  0.34 
  (20.6%)  (79.4%)     
Equitably Paid  47  192     
  (19.7%)  (80.3%)     
Underpaid  61  185     
  (24.8%)  (75.2%)     
 
Panel C: Effects of Horizontal Inequity when Peer Overstatement is Severe 
  Whistleblowing Decision  χ2  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
  Yes  No     
Overpaid  134  23  1.76  0.42 
  (85.4%)  (14.6%)     
Equitably Paid  132  29     
  (82.0%)  (18.0%)     
Underpaid  143  21     







Table 13: (Continued) 
Panel D: Effects of Severity of Peer Overstatement on Whistleblowing Behavior 
  Whistleblowing Decision  χ2  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
  Yes  No     
Not Severe  156  562  461.29  0.00 
 (21.7%)  (78.3%)     
         
Severe  409  73     
 (84.9%)  (15.1%)     
The percentage in the parentheses is the percentage of participants’ whistleblowing 
decisions within each horizontal inequity condition. 
 
The Effects of Capacity for Budget Slack on Budget Slack (H3a) 
H3a predicts that employees create more budget slack as their capacity for 
overstating budgeted production cost increases. As shown in Table 7, the mean budget 
slack was 129.50 in the large capacity for budget slack condition and was 72.58 in the 
small capacity for budget slack condition. This difference in budget slack was statistically 
significant (Table 8, F = 56.03, p < 0.01, two-tailed). Thus, H3a is supported. 
A linear mixed model was used in order to control for the heteroscedasticity 
within participants due to repeated measurements. The results in Panel A of Table 5 show 
a significant impact of capacity for budget slack on budget slack (F = 21.90, p < 0.01), 
supporting H3a. That is, participants who possessed large capacity for budget slack 




The Effects of Capacity for Budget Slack on Percentage of Honesty (H3a) 
 Another ANOVA test with percentage of honesty as the dependent variable was 
conducted. Table 8 reports that capacity for budget slack had a significant main effect on 
participants’ percentage of honesty (F = 89.19, p < 0.01, two-tailed). However, the 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 7 suggest that the percentage of honesty increased as 
the capacity for overstating production cost increased (0.70 vs. 0.85). This trend can be 
explained by two reasons. First, it is consistent with Hannan et al. (2006) that employees 
tend to report less honestly when an information system that discloses their private 
information becomes more precise25 to forgo the benefits of appearing honest. Second, 
using percentage of honesty to measure the degree of honesty in reporting may lead to 
biased results. Specifically, the percentage of honesty is lower (higher) when an 
employee’s capacity for budget slack is smaller (larger), even if the employee creates the 
same amount of budget slack in both conditions26. 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the effects of capacity for budget slack on percentage 
of honesty by using a linear mix model to adjust for heteroscedasticity within 
participants.  As shown, participants’ capacity for budget slack was significantly 
associated with their percentage of honesty (F = 35.40, p < 0.01, one-tailed). However, 
percentage of honesty was higher in the large capacity condition than in the small 
capacity condition. 
                                                 
25 The maximum amount of budget slack an employee can create is less under a precise information system 
than under a coarse information system. That is, an employee’s capacity for budget slack decreases as an 
information system becomes more precise. 
26 For instance, if an employee overstates the production cost by 200, his/her percentage of honesty is 0.75 
(0.5) when the capacity for budget slack is 800 (400). 
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The Effects of Severity of Peer Overstatement on Willingness to Blow the Whistle (H3b) 
H3b predicts that employees are more likely to blow the whistle when the budget 
slack created by their peers is severe. Results of Table 9 show that the average percentage 
of whistleblowing on misreporting peers was higher when peer overstatement was severe 
compared to when peer overstatement was not severe (0.85 vs. 0.33), and the difference 
was significant (Table 10, F = 249.35, p < 0.01, two-tailed). Therefore, H3b is supported, 
suggesting that employees are more willing to blow the whistle when their peers 
overstate their budgets to a greater extent. 
A repeated-measure ANOVA was conducted as well. As reported in Panel A of 
Table 11, the severity of peer overstatement was significantly associated with 
participants’ whistleblowing decisions (F = 321.35, p < 0.01). Specifically, participants’ 
willingness to blow the whistle increased as their peers’ wrongdoing became severe, 
which provides support for H3b. 
Cross-tabulation analysis was conducted as an additional analysis. As indicated in 
Panel B and Panel C of Table 13, participants were less likely to blow the whistle on their 
misreporting peers when severity of peer overstatement was not severe (21.7% vs. 
78.3%) and were more likely to do so when severity of peer overstatement was severe 
(84.9% vs. 15.1%). The main effect of severity of peer overstatement on employees’ 
whistleblowing decisions was significant (chi-square = 461.29, p < 0.01). In other words, 
H3b is supported. 
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Control Variables and ANCOVA Tests 
Fairness Perception and Pay Satisfaction 
 Participants were asked to assess their relative fairness perception, that is, their 
perceived fairness regarding their base salary when the base salary was compared to that 
of their peers. Specifically, they were required to rate their agreement on a 7-point rating 
scale “How fair did you think your base salary was compared to the base salary of the 
other manager” in the post-experiment questionnaire. Table 14 reports means for 
participants’ relative fairness perception in the three conditions and Figure 4 graphs those 
means. The data reveal that participants’ relative fairness perception was significantly 
higher when they were paid equitably than when they were paid more than their peers 
(6.50 vs. 2.79, p < 0.01, two-tailed). Also, participants enjoyed a significantly higher 
level of relative fairness perception when they were paid relatively higher than when they 
were paid relatively lower (2.79 vs. 1.85, p < 0.01, two-tailed). Relative fairness 
perception was highest when horizontal equity existed and was lowest when participants 
were paid less than their peers. 
 















Table 14: Relative Fairness Perception by Horizontal Inequity Manipulation 
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) 
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Panel B: Statistical Tests 
       







     
  















The means represent the average of the relative fairness perception item listed in 
Appendix N. 
 
 Participants were asked to assess their absolute fairness perception, that is, their 
overall perceived fairness regarding their base salary, in the post-experiment 
questionnaire as well. Specifically, they were required to indicate their agreements on 
two items: “The amount of base salary I received was fair” and “Considering the effort I 
put into my work, my base salary was fair”. The two items were summed to construct 
participants’ absolute fairness perception. Both Table 15 and Figure 5 show that absolute 
fairness perception was highest (11.08) when participants were paid the same as their 





Figure 5: Absolute Fairness Perception by Horizontal Inequity Manipulation 
 
 
Table 15: Absolute Fairness Perception by Horizontal Inequity Manipulation 
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) 
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Panel B: Statistical Tests 
       







     
  
































The post-experiment questionnaire included one scale to measure participants’ 
relative pay satisfaction, that is, their satisfaction regarding their base salary when the 
base salary was compared to that of their peers. Specifically, participants were asked to 
show their agreement on a statement “I am satisfied with my base salary compared to that 
of the other manager”. As indicated in Table 16 and Figure 6, relative pay satisfaction 
was highest (6.05) when participants were paid the same as their peers and was lowest 
when participants were paid less than their peers (1.66). 
 




















Table 16: Relative Pay Satisfaction by Horizontal Inequity Manipulation 
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) 
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Panel B: Statistical Tests 
       







     
  















The means represent the average of the relative pay satisfaction item listed in 
Appendix N. 
 
 I also put two questions in the post-experiment questionnaire to measure 
participants’ absolute pay satisfaction, that is, their overall satisfaction regarding the base 
salary they received. Specifically, participants were asked to indicate their agreements on 
two items: “I am satisfied with my base salary” and “Considering the effort I put into my 
work, I am satisfied with my base salary”. The two items were summed to construct 
absolute pay satisfaction. Table 17 and Figure 7 present the means for their absolute pay 
satisfaction in the three conditions. Precisely, participants were less satisfied when they 
were paid less than their peers compared to when they were paid equitably (5.39 vs. 
11.13, p < 0.01, one-tailed). Contrary to Adams’ (1963, 1965) proposition, participants 
were more satisfied with their base salary in the overpaid condition compared to the 
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equitably paid condition (11.69 vs. 11.13, p = 0.10, one-tailed), even though their relative 
fairness perception and absolute fairness perception were significantly lower when they 
were paid more than their peers. To summarize, absolute pay satisfaction was highest 
when participants were paid more than their peers and was lowest when participants were 
paid less than their peers.  
 






















Table 17: Absolute Pay Satisfaction by Horizontal Inequity Manipulation 
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) 
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Panel B: Statistical Tests 
       







     
  



















  Prior studies (Childs 2012; Muehlheusser, Roider, and Wallmeier 2015) suggest 
that males have a greater tendency to engage in opportunistic behavior in the form of 
lying for small monetary gain and that lying is more prevalent in male-dominated groups 
than female groups. Therefore, to control for the potential impact gender has on honesty, 
I added Gender27 as a covariate into my main analyses. The results of the ANCOVA tests 
are presented in Table 18 and Table 19. As illustrated, the main statistical results are 
consistent with prior results after adjusting for gender effect. Gender only had a 
                                                 
27 Gender equals 1 if the participant is male, 0 otherwise (female). 
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significant effect on reporting honesty when it was measured by the amount of budget 
slack overstated by participants (Panel A of Table 18, F = 3.84, p = 0.05, two-tailed). 
Specifically, male participants built a greater amount of budget slack (107.01 vs. 90.35, F 
= 4.22, p = 0.04, two tailed, untabulated) than female participants. However, gender did 
not significantly affect participants’ whistleblowing decisions (Table 19, F = 0.05, p = 
0.83, two-tailed). 
 
Table 18: Effects of Horizontal Inequity and Capacity for Budget Slack on Reporting 
Behavior (Gender Effect) 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Budget Slack (n = 1,200) 
 
Source  df  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2  7.46  0.00 
Capacity for Budget Slack  1  56.16  0.00 
Horizontal Inequity × 
Capacity for Budget Slack 
 2  1.47  0.23 
Gender  1  3.84  0.05 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Percentage of Honesty (n = 1,200) 
 
Source  df  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2  7.83  0.00 
Capacity for Budget Slack  1  89.15  0.00 
Horizontal Inequity × 
Capacity for Budget Slack 
 2  0.80  0.45 
Gender  1  0.41  0.52 
Budget slack = the amount of funding requested by an employee minus the actual 
amount of funding needed. 
Percentage of Honesty = 1 – Budget Slack/Slack Available, where Slack Available 
is the difference between the maximum amount of production cost and the actual 
amount of funding needed. 




Table 19: Effects of Horizontal Inequity and Severity of Peer Overstatement on 
Whistleblowing Behavior (Gender Effect) 
Dependent Variable = Individual Whistleblowing Percentage (n = 240) 
 
Source  df  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2  1.37  0.26 
Severity of Peer Overstatement  1  248.33  0.00 
Horizontal Inequity × Severity of 
Peer Overstatement 
 2  0.15  0.86 
Gender  1  0.05  0.83 
Percentage of Whistleblowing = the percentage of truthful whistleblowing on lying 
peers. 




Further analyses indicated that male participants and female participants differ in 
certain personality traits. In order to measure participants’ personality traits, I asked them 
to indicate their degree of agreement on several statements on several 7-point rating 
scales28 in the post-experiment questionnaire (Appendix N). The scales includes eight 
questions to measure vertical individualism (Singelis et al. 1995), eight questions to 
measure horizontal collectivism (Singelis et al. 1995), six questions to measure risk 
aversion (Mandrik and Bao 2005), and ten questions to measure idealism (Forsyth 1980). 
I conducted an exploratory factor analysis with factors rotated using varimax. Given the 
sample size of 120, the threshold for factor loadings was set to be 0.5 (Hair, Black, 
Babin, Anderson, and Tatham 2005). As shown in Table 20, all the eight items of 
                                                 
28 The scales were labeled from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
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Vertical Individualism were loaded at acceptable levels (cronbach’s alpha29 = 0.60, 
untabulated). However, four items were deleted because of low factor loadings. Table 21 
shows that removal of the four items resulted in stronger loadings and higher cronbach’s 
alphas. Specifically, after deleting item HC7 (“My happiness depends very much on the 
happiness of those around me”), most of the factor loadings of the remaining items of 
Horizontal Collectivism were higher and the cronbach’s alpha increased from 0.81 to 
0.83. Similarly, after deleting item RA5 (“I feel comfortable improvising in new 
situations”), most of the factor loadings of the remaining items of Risk Aversion were 
higher and the cronbach’s alpha increased from 0.62 to 0.81. The removal of item I7 
(“Deciding whether or not to perform an act by balancing the positive consequences of 
the act against the negative consequences of the act is immoral”) and item I10 (“Moral 
actions are those which closely match ideals of the most “perfect” action”) led to a higher 
cronbach’s alpha (0.88) of Idealism. That is, after deleting the four items, the modified 
scales could represent horizontal collectivism, risk aversion, and idealism more 
accurately in this study. The remaining items within each scale were summed to construct 






                                                 
29 Cronbach’s alpha was utilized to determine reliability. A cronbach’s alpha between 0.60 and 0.70 is 
considered to have a fair reliability, and a cronbach’s alpha between 0.80 and 0.96 is considered to have a 
very good reliability (Babin and Zikmund 2015). 
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Table 20: Exploratory Factor Analysis 
  













































































































































































































































































































The items of each personality trait scale are shown in Appendix O.  
The exploratory factor analysis was conducted with varimax factor rotation. 





Table 21: Personality Traits Factor Analysis – Factor Loadings 
Panel A: Horizontal Collectivism – Factor Loadings 
 
With All 8 Items 
 
With 7 Items 
Item 
























Cronbach's Alpha 0.81 
 
0.83 
    Panel B: Risk Aversion – Factor Loadings 
 
With All 6 Items 
 



















Cronbach's Alpha 0.62 
 
0.81 
    Panel C: Idealism – Factor Loadings 
 
With All 10 Items 
 































Cronbach's Alpha 0.86 
 
0.88 
The items of each personality trait scale are shown in Appendix O.  




Table 22 presents the correlations of items within each personality trait scale. 
Panel A shows strong correlations range from -0.47 to 0.6 among all eight items (VI1 - 
VI8) within Vertical Individualism30. Panel B shows that all items within Horizontal 
Collectivism were significantly correlated with each other except for item HC7. Panel C 
shows strong correlations among most of the items within Risk Aversion. No significant 
correlation between item RA2 and RA5 was detected. Similarly, Panel D shows strong 
correlations among most items within Idealism except for item I10. Specifically, item I10 
was not significantly correlated with item I4, I5, I6, or I7. Also, item I7 was only 











                                                 
30 Negative correlations existed because item VI8 was reverse coded. 
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Table 22: Personality Traits Correlations 
Panel A: Vertical Individualism (n = 120) 
Items VI1 VI2 VI3 VI4 VI5 VI6 VI7 VI8 
VI1 1.00 
       VI2 0.29** 1.00 
      VI3 0.60** 0.24** 1.00 
     VI4 0.27** 0.47** 0.13 1.00 
    VI5 0.40** 0.24** 0.33** 0.30** 1.00 
   VI6 0.49** 0.26** 0.40** 0.31** 0.43** 1.00 
  VI7 0.28** 0.44** 0.21* 0.35** 0.41** 0.42** 1.00 
 VI8 -0.43** -0.20* -0.28** -0.19* -0.47** -0.36** -0.46** 1.00 
         Panel B: Horizontal Collectivism (n = 120) 
Items HC1 HC2 HC3 HC4 HC5 HC6 HC7 HC8 
HC1 1.00 
       HC2 0.59** 1.00 
      HC3 0.33** 0.43** 1.00 
     HC4 0.43** 0.45** 0.60** 1.00 
    HC5 0.35** 0.47** 0.35** 0.33** 1.00 
   HC6 0.42** 0.45** 0.33** 0.55** 0.50** 1.00 
  HC7 0.21* 0.27** 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.19* 1.00 
 HC8 0.30** 0.43** 0.33** 0.40** 0.51** 0.50** 0.41** 1.00 
         Panel C: Risk Aversion (n = 120) 
Items RA1 RA2 RA3 RA4 RA5 RA6 
  RA1 1.00      
  RA2 0.53** 1.00     
  RA3 0.49** 0.48** 1.00    
  RA4 0.51** 0.41** 0.49** 1.00   
  RA5 -0.37** -0.11 -0.25** -0.25** 1.00  
  RA6 0.41** 0.31** 0.50** 0.41** -0.29** 1.00 









Table 22: (Continued) 
 
Panel D: Idealism (n = 120) 
Items I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8 I9 I10 
I1 1.00 
         I2 0.57** 1.00 
        I3 0.62** 0.66** 1.00 
       I4 0.50** 0.47** 0.52** 1.00 
      I5 0.49** 0.38** 0.55** 0.53** 1.00 
     I6 0.44** 0.52** 0.47** 0.49** 0.46** 1.00 
    I7 0.24** 0.39** 0.34** 0.38** 0.20* 0.34** 1.00 
   I8 0.34** 0.33** 0.50** 0.36** 0.41** 0.32** 0.35** 1.00 
  I9 0.36** 0.57** 0.58** 0.39** 0.46** 0.48** 0.35** 0.41** 1.00 
 I10 0.39** 0.28** 0.23* 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.05 0.20* 0.29** 1.00 
*, **, Denote significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
The items of each personality trait scale are shown in Appendix O. 
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Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables 
Table 23 provides the descriptive statistics of the scales31. The mean (standard 
deviation) of relative fairness perception was 3.71 (2.22), and the mean (standard 
deviation) of absolute fairness perception was 8.20 (3.44). Relative pay satisfaction had a 
mean (standard deviation) of 4.22 (2.22), and absolute pay satisfaction had a mean 
(standard deviation) of 9.35 (3.47). The mean (standard deviation) of vertical 
individualism was 34.68 (7.88), and the mean (standard deviation) of horizontal 
collectivism was 40.34 (5.41). Risk aversion had a mean (standard deviation) of 21.59 










                                                 
31 After the removal of the four items with low factor loadings, the remaining items within each personality 




Table 23: Descriptive Statistics of Fairness Perception, Pay Satisfaction, and Personality 
Traits 
Scales   Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
 Minimum  Maximum 
Relative Fairness 
Perception 
 3.71  2.22  1  7 
Absolute Fairness 
Perception 
 8.20  3.44  2  14 
Relative Pay 
Satisfaction 
 4.22  2.22  1  7 
Absolute Pay 
Satisfaction 
 9.35  3.47  2  14 
Vertical 
Individualism 
 34.68  7.88  14  52 
Horizontal 
Collectivism 
 40.34  5.41  20  49 
Risk Aversion  21.59  5.29  7  34 
Idealism  41.04  8.23  13  56 
The items of each fairness perception and pay satisfaction scale are shown in 
Appendix N. 
The items of each personality trait scale are shown in Appendix O. Items are 
summed to construct each scale. The last item of vertical individualism (VI8) is 
reverse coded. 
 
Panel A of Table 24 shows the overall correlations among the scales. Horizontal 
inequity, relative fairness perception, absolute fairness perception, absolute fairness 
perception, and relative pay satisfaction were significantly correlated with each other. In 
addition, absolute pay satisfaction was negatively correlated with total budget slack, 
indicating that participants who are not satisfied with their overall base salary created 
more budget slack. Further, gender32 and relative fairness perception had a negative 
correlation of -0.24, suggesting that male participants were more sensitive to the fairness 
of their base salary when their base salary is compared to that of their peers. Besides, 
gender was positively correlated with vertical individualism and negatively correlated 
                                                 
32 Gender = 1 if the participant is male, 0 otherwise. 
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with horizontal collectivism and idealism, indicating that male participants exhibited a 
higher level of vertical individualism and lower levels of horizontal collectivism and 
idealism than females. Also, horizontal collectivism was significantly correlated with 
idealism with a Pearson correlation of 0.55, which is reasonable given that both scales 
emphasize the importance of group harmony. Specifically, as shown in Table 25, most of 
the items of horizontal collectivism and idealism were significantly positively correlated. 
Panel B and Panel C of Table 24 show consistent results when peer overstatement was 










Table 24: Correlation Table 
Panel A: Overall Correlations  
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. Horizontal 
Inequity 
1.00            
2. Total Budget 
Slack 
-0.09 1.00           
3. Percentage of 
Whistleblowing  
-0.13 -0.15 1.00          
4. Gender -0.20* 0.08 0.02 1.00         
5. Relative Fairness 
Perception 
0.86** -0.08 -0.05 -0.24** 1.00        
6. Absolute 
Fairness Perception 
0.76** -0.09 -0.04 -0.15 0.70** 1.00       
7. Relative Pay 
Satisfaction 
0.82** -0.17 0.00 -0.17 0.69** 0.75** 1.00      
8. Absolute Pay 
Satisfaction 
0.68** -0.20* -0.06 -0.10 0.49** 0.79** 0.80** 1.00     
9. Vertical 
Individualism 
0.02 0.12 0.08 0.24** -0.10 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.00    
10. Horizontal 
Collectivism 
-0.07 -0.03 0.07 -0.25** -0.12 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 1.00   
11. Risk Aversion 0.08 0.00 0.11 -0.16 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.11 -0.06 0.02 1.00  










Table 24: (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Correlations when Peer Overstatement is Not Severe 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. Horizontal 
Inequity 
1.00           
2. Percentage of 
Whistleblowing 
-0.11 1.00          
3. Gender -0.20* 0.09 1.00         
4. Relative Fairness 
Perception 
0.86** -0.06 -0.24** 1.00        
5. Absolute 
Fairness Perception 
0.76** -0.05 -0.15 0.70** 1.00       
6. Relative Pay 
Satisfaction 
0.82** -0.06 -0.17 0.69** 0.75** 1.00      
7. Absolute Pay 
Satisfaction 
0.68** -0.10 -0.10 0.49** 0.79** 0.80** 1.00     
8. Vertical 
Individualism 
0.02 0.03 0.24** -0.10 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.00    
9. Horizontal 
Collectivism 
-0.07 0.02 -0.25** -0.12 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 1.00   
10. Risk Aversion 0.08 0.09 -0.16 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.11 -0.06 0.02 1.00  










Table 24: (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Correlations when Peer Overstatement is Severe 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. Horizontal Inequity 1.00           
2. Percentage of Whistleblowing  -0.10 1.00          
3. Gender -0.20* -0.10 1.00         
4. Relative Fairness Perception 0.86** -0.03 -0.24** 1.00        
5. Absolute Fairness Perception 0.76** -0.01 -0.15 0.70** 1.00       
6. Relative Pay Satisfaction 0.82** 0.06 -0.17 0.69** 0.75** 1.00      
7. Absolute Pay Satisfaction 0.68** 0.01 -0.10 0.49** 0.79** 0.80** 1.00     
8. Vertical Individualism 0.02 0.09 0.24** -0.10 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.00    
9. Horizontal Collectivism -0.07 0.11 -0.25** -0.12 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 1.00   
10. Risk Aversion 0.08 0.10 -0.16 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.11 -0.06 0.02 1.00  
11. Idealism 0.03 0.01 -0.27** 0.02 0.12 0.08 0.04 -0.16 0.55** 0.11 1.00 
*, **, Denote significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
Total Budget Slack = the total amount of the budget slack a manager created in the ten periods. 
Percentage of Whistleblowing = the percentage of truthful whistleblowing on lying peers. 
Gender = 1 if the participant is male, 0 otherwise.  
The items of each fairness perception and pay satisfaction scale are shown in Appendix N.  
The items of each personality trait scale are shown in Appendix O. Items are summed to construct each scale. The last item of 






Table 25: Correlations between Horizontal Collectivism and Idealism 
 Item
s 
HC1 HC2 HC3 HC4 HC5 HC6 HC8 I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I8 I9 
HC1 1.00                             
HC2 0.59** 1.00                           
HC3 0.33** 0.43** 1.00                         
HC4 0.43** 0.45** 0.60** 1.00                       
HC5 0.35** 0.47** 0.35** 0.33** 1.00                     
HC6 0.42** 0.45** 0.33** 0.55** 0.50** 1.00                   
HC8 0.30** 0.43** 0.33** 0.40** 0.51** 0.50** 1.00                 
I1 0.43** 0.42** 0.30** 0.29** 0.28** 0.30** 0.28** 1.00               
I2 0.29** 0.32** 0.18 0.25** 0.35** 0.19* 0.33** 0.57** 1.00             
I3 0.42** 0.40** 0.31** 0.38** 0.45** 0.32** 0.36** 0.62** 0.66** 1.00           
I4 0.52** 0.30** 0.16 0.27** 0.37** 0.35** 0.29** 0.50** 0.47** 0.52** 1.00         
I5 0.38** 0.17 0.21* 0.32** 0.19* 0.23* 0.23* 0.49** 0.38** 0.55** 0.53** 1.00       
I6 0.38** 0.35** 0.22* 0.24** 0.18 0.09 0.17 0.44** 0.52** 0.47** 0.49** 0.46** 1.00     
I8 0.32** 0.28** 0.23* 0.41** 0.19* 0.26** 0.30** 0.34** 0.33** 0.50** 0.36** 0.41** 0.32** 1.00   
I9 0.24** 0.25** 0.06 .22* 0.24** 0.25** 0.29** 0.35** 0.57** 0.58** 0.39** 0.46** 0.48** 0.41** 1.00 
*, **, Denote significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). 




 ANCOVA tests were conducted to test the effects of horizontal inequity and 
severity of peer overstatement on employees’ reporting honesty by including the control 
variables. Panel A of Table 26 shows the effect of horizontal inequity on the total amount 
of budget slack created by participants when all the control variables were included in the 
model. None of the control variables or horizontal inequity had significant effect on total 
budget slack. Panel B of Table 26 shows the ANCOVA results when only the reasonable 
control variables33 were kept in the model. Still, no significant effect was detected. Since 
none of the control variables was significant, a one-way contrast analysis of horizontal 
inequity on total budget slack was employed. Contrast weights were +1 for the underpaid 
condition, -1 for the overpaid condition, and 0 for the equitably paid condition. The 
planned contrast was significant (Table 27, p = 0.09, two-tailed), supporting H1a and 
H1b that employees are most honest when they are paid more than their peers and are 






                                                 
33 Absolute pay satisfaction was kept because it showed a higher level of significance than other fairness 
perception and pay satisfaction variables, and vertical individualism was kept because it showed a higher 
level of significance than other personality trait variables. 
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Table 26: Effects of Horizontal Inequity on Total Budget Slack (ANCOVA) 
Dependent Variable = Total Budget Slack (n = 120) 
 
Panel A: All Control Variables Included 
 
Source  df  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2  0.44  0.64 
Gender  1  0.06  0.81 
Relative Fairness Perception  1  0.49  0.49 
Absolute Fairness Perception  1  1.94  0.17 
Relative Pay Satisfaction  1  0.54  0.47 
Absolute Pay Satisfaction  1  2.48  0.12 
Vertical Individualism  1  0.91  0.34 
Horizontal Collectivism  1  0.03  0.86 
Risk Aversion  1  0.14  0.71 
Idealism  1  0.44  0.51 
       
Panel B: Absolute Pay Satisfaction and Vertical Individualism Included 
       
Source  df  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2  0.32  0.73 
Absolute Pay Satisfaction  1  2.40  0.12 
Vertical Individualism  1  1.72  0.19 
Total Budget Slack = the total amount of the budget slack a manager created in the ten 
periods. 
Gender = 1 if the participant is male, 0 otherwise. 
The items of each fairness perception and pay satisfaction scale are shown in 
Appendix N. 
The items of each personality trait scale are shown in Appendix O. Items are summed 







Table 27: Effects of Horizontal Inequity on Total Budget Slack (Contrast Model) 
Dependent Variable = Budget Slack (n = 120) 
 
Source  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2.83  0.09 
Total Budget Slack = the total amount of the budget slack a manager created in the 
ten periods. Contrast weights are +1 in the underpaid condition, -1 in the overpaid 
condition, and 0 in the equitably paid condition. 
 
Panel A of Table 28 shows the effects of horizontal inequity and severity of peer 
overstatement on participants’ whistleblowing behavior when all control variables were 
included in the model. Both horizontal inequity and severity of peer overstatement 
significantly affected whistleblowing percentage, supporting H2a, H2b, and H3b. 
Specifically, participants who were paid less than their peers were most likely to blow the 
whistle while participants who were paid equitable were least likely to blow the whistle. 
Additionally, participants were more likely to blow the whistle when the overstatement of 
their peer was severe. Also, control variables Relative Pay Satisfaction and Risk Aversion 
were significantly correlated with whistleblowing percentage. As shown in Panel B of 
Table 28, the results are consistent when only the reasonable control variables34 were 




                                                 




Table 28: Effects of Horizontal Inequity and Severity of Peer Overstatement on 
Whistleblowing Behavior (ANCOVA) 
Dependent Variable = Individual Whistleblowing Percentage (n = 240) 
 
Panel A: All Control Variables Included 
 
Source  df  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2  4.91  0.01 
Severity of Peer Overstatement  1  254.15  0.00 
Horizontal Inequity × Severity of 
Peer Overstatement 
 2  0.16  0.86 
Gender  1  0.14  0.71 
Relative Fairness Perception  1  1.76  0.19 
Absolute Fairness Perception  1  0.32  0.57 
Relative Pay Satisfaction  1  4.13  0.04 
Absolute Pay Satisfaction  1  0.52  0.47 
Vertical Individualism  1  0.87  0.35 
Horizontal Collectivism  1  1.22  0.27 
Risk Aversion  1  3.97  0.05 
Idealism  1  0.18  0.67 
       
Panel B: Relative Pay Satisfaction and Risk Aversion Included 
       
Source  df  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2  4.99  0.01 
Severity of Peer Overstatement  1  257.23  0.00 
Horizontal Inequity × Severity of 
Peer Overstatement 
 2  0.16  0.85 
Relative Pay Satisfaction  1  6.72  0.01 
Risk Aversion  1  3.30  0.07 
Percentage of Whistleblowing = the percentage of truthful whistleblowing on lying 
peers. 
Gender = 1 if the participant is male, 0 otherwise. 
The items of each fairness perception and pay satisfaction scale are shown in 
Appendix N. 
The items of each personality trait scale are shown in Appendix O. Items are summed 




 Table 29 shows the simple effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing 
percentage when peer overstatement was not severe. However, none of the control 
variables or horizontal inequity had significant effect on whistleblowing percentage. 
Table 30 shows the simple effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing percentage 
when peer overstatement was severe. Panel A of Table 30 shows that horizontal inequity 
and relative pay satisfaction significantly affected whistleblowing percentage, supporting 
H2a and H2b. Consistent results were found when only the reasonable control variables 














Table 29: Effects of Horizontal Inequity on Whistleblowing Behavior When the Peer 
Overstatement is Not Severe (ANCOVA) 
Dependent Variable = Individual Whistleblowing Percentage (n = 120) 
 
Panel A: All Control Variables Included 
 
Source  df  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2  0.95  0.39 
Gender  1  1.37  0.24 
Relative Fairness Perception  1  0.25  0.62 
Absolute Fairness Perception  1  0.57  0.45 
Relative Pay Satisfaction  1  0.95  0.33 
Absolute Pay Satisfaction  1  0.95  0.33 
Vertical Individualism  1  0.03  0.85 
Horizontal Collectivism  1  0.03  0.86 
Risk Aversion  1  2.03  0.16 
Idealism  1  0.13  0.72 
       
Panel B: Relative Pay Satisfaction and Risk Aversion Included 
       
Source  df  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2  1.24  0.30 
Relative Pay Satisfaction  1  0.99  0.32 
Risk Aversion  1  1.45  0.23 
Percentage of Whistleblowing = the percentage of truthful whistleblowing on lying 
peers. 
Gender = 1 if the participant is male, 0 otherwise. 
The items of each fairness perception and pay satisfaction scale are shown in 
Appendix N. 
The items of each personality trait scale are shown in Appendix O. Items are summed 






Table 30: Effects of Horizontal Inequity on Whistleblowing Behavior When the Peer 
Overstatement is Severe (ANCOVA) 
Dependent Variable = Individual Whistleblowing Percentage (n = 120) 
 
Panel A: All Control Variables Included 
 
Source  df  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2  5.92  0.00 
Gender  1  1.02  0.32 
Relative Fairness Perception  1  2.48  0.12 
Absolute Fairness Perception  1  0.01  0.92 
Relative Pay Satisfaction  1  4.51  0.04 
Absolute Pay Satisfaction  1  0.02  0.89 
Vertical Individualism  1  1.80  0.18 
Horizontal Collectivism  1  2.70  0.10 
Risk Aversion  1  1.99  0.16 
Idealism  1  1.55  0.22 
       
Panel B: Relative Pay Satisfaction and Risk Aversion Included 
       
Source  df  F-Value  p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 
Horizontal Inequity  2  5.27  0.00 
Relative Pay Satisfaction  1  9.32  0.00 
Risk Aversion  1  2.04  0.16 
Percentage of Whistleblowing = the percentage of truthful whistleblowing on lying 
peers. 
Gender = 1 if the participant is male, 0 otherwise. 
The items of each fairness perception and pay satisfaction scale are shown in 
Appendix N. 
The items of each personality trait scale are shown in Appendix O. Items are summed 







This chapter begins with a summary of the findings from the data analyses 
presented in the previous chapter. Theoretical and practical implications of this study 
are then delineated. A discussion of the limitations of this study and the potential 
directions for future research concludes this chapter.  
Summary of Findings 
 My study investigates the effect of horizontal inequity, capacity for budget 
slack, and severity of peer overstatement on employees’ reporting honesty and their 
willingness to blow the whistle on misreporting peers in a peer reporting context. The 
results indicate that employees report their budgets most honestly when they are paid 
more than their peers and report least honestly when they are paid less than their 
peers. In addition, employees are most likely to blow the whistle when they are paid 
less than their peers and are least likely to do so when they are paid the same as their 
peers35. Further, the results suggest that employees create more budget slack as their 
capacity for creating budget slack increases. Also, employees’ willingness to blow the 
                                                 
35 Both ANOVA tests and ANCOVA tests suggest that employees who are paid less than their their 
peers are more likely to blow the whistle on misreporting peers compared to employees who are paid 
the same as their peers. Further, ANCOVA tests suggest that employees who are paid more than their 
peers are more likely to blow the whistle compared to employees who are paid the same as their peers. 
ANCOVA tests also suggest that employees who are paid less than their peers are more likely to blow 
the whistle compared to employees who are paid more than their peers. Taken together, employees are 
most likely to blow the whistle when they are paid less than their peers and are least likely to blow the 
whistle when they are paid the same as their peers. 
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whistle on misreporting peers is positively associated with the severity of their peer’s 
overstatement of budgeted production cost. 
Contributions and Implications 
My study contributes to theory and practice on multiple dimensions. First, it adds 
to the growing literature (Luft 1997; Fisher et al. 2002; Sprinkle 2003; Towry 2003; 
Zhang 2008; Matuszewski 2010) that consolidates theories from both economics and 
psychology to examine accounting issues in a multi-agent setting. Specifically, the 
results provide insights to how horizontal inequity, capacity for budget slack, and 
severity of peer overstatement influence the effectiveness of a peer reporting system 
in eliciting employees’ private information and controlling their opportunistic 
behavior. 
Second, my study seeks to answer the call for more research on the overpayment 
effect of horizontal inequity on employees’ reactions by providing an experimental 
test of how horizontal inequity, including both the underpayment effect and the 
overpayment effect, affect employees’ degree of honesty in managerial reporting. 
Although the predictions derived from the underpayment effect of Adams’ (1963, 
1965) equity theory are supported by various studies (Clark 1958; Homans 1953; 
Lawler and O’Gara 1967; Scholl et al. 1987; Moser et al. 1995), such research results 
regarding the overpayment effect of horizontal inequity are controversial due to the 
serious criticism (Goodman and Friedman 1971; Carrell and Dittrich 1978; Sweeney 
1990; Mowday 1991) most studies received regarding their way of manipulation the 
overpayment effect. I use a different method, that is, paying participants more base 
salary than their comparable peers, to operationalize the overpayment effect in my 
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experiment. To my knowledge, this study is the first one to test the overpayment 
effect of horizontal inequity on employees’ decision making in an accounting setting. 
Third, my findings could be useful to companies that are using and/or are 
considering adopting a pay transparency policy. Whereas the pay transparency policy 
is likely to bring benefits such as increased productivity and job satisfaction (Lawler 
1967; Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 2011) to a firm, it may have negative consequences 
when horizontal inequity exists. My findings provide evidence that, when the salary 
information of all employees is visible throughout the company, employees who are 
paid less than their peers may take risks to reduce feelings of inequity by committing 
opportunistic acts against their companies. My study also provides a solution to 
control such opportunistic behaviors if peer monitoring is available. Specifically, 
principals can monitor and control employees’ opportunistic behavior by building a 
peer reporting system that enables employees to blow the whistle on their 
misreporting peers. Additionally, since employees are more likely to create more 
budget slack as their capacity for overstating their production cost increases, 
companies should pay particular attention on restraining employees’ opportunistic 
behaviors when high information asymmetry exists. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Despite its theoretical and practical implications, the results of my study are 
subject to various limitations, which provide opportunities for future research. For 
example, in my research design, participants were prohibited from communicating 
with each other during the experiment. However, in practice, employees working in 
the same team or performing the same task communicate with each other frequently, 
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which facilitates collusion. The possibility that employees can maximize their final 
compensation by overstating their budgets to the highest amount and covering up for 
each other may seriously threaten the effectiveness of the peer reporting system on 
controlling employees’ opportunistic behaviors. Future studies should identify and 
explore other possible factors that help to improve the effectiveness of a peer 
reporting system in monitoring employees’ opportunistic behavior when participants 
in similar experiments are allowed to communicate with each other. 
Second, my study only tests the effect of horizontal inequity, capacity for 
budget slack, and severity of peer overstatement on employees’ reporting honesty 
using a repeated measures design. Specifically, participants in my experiment did not 
know if their peers reported them for overstating production cost until they had 
completed the post-experiment questionnaire. Participants may be less likely to create 
budget slack if they know they were reported by their peers in the previous period, 
regardless of whether they are paid more or less than their peers. That is, my study 
does not examine the long-term effect of implementing a peer reporting system. 
Future studies could test the effect of the peer reporting system in a multi-period 
setting where participants are informed whether or not they are reported by their peer 
for overstating production cost at the end of each period. 
Finally, experiments “control for threats for valid inference” and allow 
researchers to “study cause-effect relations under pure and uncontaminated 
conditions” (Sprinkle 2003, p. 289). Specifically, in my study, participants were told 
to assume that the estimated/budgeted production cost provided by the forecasting 
system was the same as the actual production cost. That is, under my experimental 
design, the creation of budget slack represents opportunistic behavior. Admittedly, in 
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practice, the predicted production cost is usually different from the actual production 
cost. Employees may create budget slack due to uncertainty. Therefore, the results of 
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HUMAN SUBJECTS CONSENT FORM 
 
The following is a brief summary of the project in which you are asked to 
participate.  Please read this information before signing the statement below. 
You must be of legal age or must be co-signed by parent or guardian to 
participate in this study. Pregnant women are not eligible to participate in this 
study. 
 
TITLE OF PROJECT: Decision Making in Accounting. 
 
 
PURPOSE OF STUDY/PROJECT: To gather information about how business 
students think and make decisions. 
 
 
PROCEDURE: You will be given instructions on how to complete a simple task 
and how to fill various forms. You will be given an anonymous participant ID 
number to place on all forms so there will be no way to tie your responses to you 
specifically. All the information you supply will be kept confidential by the 
researchers and will be seen only by them. You do not give your name on any 
form containing research results. The only place you write your name is on a 
sheet verifying receipt of your pay and possibly on a sign-up sheet if you would 
like to receive the results of the experiment when it is completed. Once you 
complete the task, you will also be asked for demographic data and to answer a 
questionnaire at the end of the session. Then your compensation will be 
calculated and you will be paid.  
 
 
INSTRUMENTS: You will be given a computer-based task to make reporting 
decisions based on information provided during the experiment. 
 
 
RISKS/ALTERNATIVE TREATMENTS:  The participant understands that 
Louisiana Tech is not able to offer financial compensation nor to absorb the costs 
of medical treatment should you be injured as a result of participating in this 
research. 
 
The following disclosure applies to all participants using online survey tools: 
This server may collect information and your IP address indirectly and 
automatically via “cookies”. 
 
EXTRA CREDIT:  If extra credit is offered to students participating in research, 
an alternative extra credit that requires a similar investment of time and energy 
will also be offered to those students who do not choose to volunteer as research 
subjects. 
 
BENEFITS/COMPENSATION: At the beginning of the session you will be told 




I, ___________________, attest with my signature that I have read and 
understood the following description of the study, "Decision Making in 
Accounting", and its purposes and methods.  I understand that my participation 
in this research is strictly voluntary and my participation or refusal to 
participate in this study will not affect my relationship with Louisiana Tech 
University or my grades in any way.  Further, I understand that I may withdraw 
at any time or refuse to answer any questions without penalty.  Upon completion 
of the study, I understand that the results will be freely available to me upon 
request.  I understand that the results of my survey will be confidential, 
accessible only to the principal investigators, myself, or a legally appointed 
representative.  I have not been requested to waive nor do I waive any of my 




________________________________  _____________ 
Signature of Participant or Guardian  Date 
 
 
CONTACT INFORMATION: The principal experimenters listed below may 
be reached to  
answer questions about the research, subjects' rights, or related matters. 
 
Yiwen Li, Email: yli022@latech.edu, Phone: (318) 257-2822 
 
 
Members of the Human Use Committee of Louisiana Tech University may also 
be contacted if a problem cannot be discussed with the experimenters: 
Dr. Stan Napper (257-3056) 









<As participants come in, give them a Human Subjects Consent Form, a pen, and a 
calculator> 
<Collect consent forms from participants> 
 
Good afternoon! Thank you for coming!  
 
You will assume the role of a division manager of Beta Company. This simulation has 
to do with requesting funding and reporting, and you will be paid real cash after 
completing the study. The amount of cash you can earn is decided by the decision you 
and the other manager made. The computer will show you the instructions later.  
 
The instruction contains descriptions of the jobs you are required to do and how you 
will be compensated, as well as some questions for you to answer about your given 
task. Please read all information carefully and follow the instructions. If you are not 
comfortable with reading the instructions on the screen, I will also give you part of the 
instructions printed on the paper.  
 
After the instruction, you will be required to do some decision-making for several 
periods! Please remember that there is no right or wrong answer for the decisions you 
made. It’s totally up to you, so just follow your heart! All your information will be 
kept confidential. 
 
Also, I’ll randomly distribute a manager ID to you. Please write your manager ID 
number whenever you are asked for it. Please note there is no way for me to connect 








OK, now I’m going to give you the paper-based instructions and your manager ID. 
 
<Distribute instructions and manager IDs> 
<Start experiment> 
 
Now you can start to read the instruction and answer the questions on the computer. 
The instruction contains a lot of information, so please be patient and read all the 
information carefully. Please do not play with your cell phone or talk with each other 










SCREEN 1 [SAME FOR ALL CONDITIONS] 
Instructions 
Welcome to Beta Company! I’m happy to inform you that you are hired as the 
manager of Beta Company Division A. Beta Company produces parts for the auto 
industry. Your job is to produce 500 parts in each period. You need to request funding 
from the owner of Beta Company to produce the parts.  
As the Division A manager, you have a private forecasting system that tells 
you the actual amount of funding you need to produce 500 units of the parts. 
However, the owner ONLY knows that your funding needs are between 3,000 
and 4,000 Lira, in increments of 50 Lira. Since Beta is a large company, there is 
another division (e.g., Division B) that also produces 500 units of the same part in 
each period. You know Division B’s funding needs will be very similar to your 
funding needs. The manager of Division B has the same private forecasting system 
that reveals the actual amount of funding Division B needs. Likewise, the manager of 
Division B knows that his/her funding needs are very similar to your funding needs.  
You will be asked to make decisions for several periods, and your 
compensation will be based on the decisions made by you and the manager of 
Division B. To determine the amount of rewards you earn, one of the periods will be 
randomly selected to determine your compensation. You will be compensated at the 
rate of $1.00 for each 100 Lira you earn in that period. The following instructions 
describe what you will be doing in more detail.  
If you have any questions during the study, please raise your hand and the 













SCREEN 2 [SAME FOR CONDITIONS] 
Requesting Funding 
You need to complete a Funding Request Form for your division (Division A) 
to get funding for producing 500 units of a part (e.g., Part X) from the owner in each 
period. Because the owner does NOT know your division’s actual funding needs, you 
can request any amount of funding between the actual amount of funding you 
need and 4,000 Lira to the owner. You will receive the funding you requested as 
long as the request is between 3,000 Lira and 4,000 Lira (in increments of 50 Lira). 
The manager of Division B will request funding for his/her division as well. 
After you and the manager of Division B make funding requests, you will be shown 
Division B’s Funding Request Form that documents how much funding Division 
B’s manager requested from the owner. 
 
Reporting 
Then you will submit a Peer Reporting Form where you will decide whether to 
report that Division B’s manager requested more funding than you think it took to 
produce 500 units of Part X. Note that while you may be fairly sure whether the 
manager of Division B overstated or not, you are not required to report it. You can 
choose to report either “Overstated” or “Not Overstated,” regardless of what 
you think the manager of Division B actually did. 
The manager of Division B will complete the same reporting form. 
 
 When you think that the manager of Division B has overstated the amount of 
funding needed:  
o You can choose not to notify the owner of this overstatement. In this 
case, the manager of Division B can keep the overstatement as 
additional compensation. 
o You can choose to report it to the owner. In this case, the manager of 
Division B cannot keep the overstatement and you can receive 20% of 
the other manager’s overstatement as a reward if he/she did in fact 
overstate. 
 
 If you falsely accuse Division B’s manager of overstating when in fact he/she 
did not, you will lose your entire compensation including your base salary in 
that period. 
 
 Additionally, if you overstate the amount of funding you need and: 
118 
 
o If you are not reported by the manager of Division B as having 
overstated your funding needs, you will receive any difference between 
your requested funding needs and the actual funding needs as 
additional overstatement compensation. For example, if your actual 
funding needs are 3,500 Lira and you request 3,700 Lira, you could 
earn additional compensation of 200 Lira. 
o If you are reported by the manager of Division B as having overstated 
your funding needs, you cannot keep the overstatement compensation 
and you will be assessed a penalty equal to 20% of your overstatement. 
 
















SCREEN 3 [SAME FOR ALL CONDITIONS] 




 If you think the other manager overstated his/her funding needs and you 
choose to report it to the owner, you can get a reporting reward. 













































































If the other manager 
says you overstated 
If the other manager says 
you did not overstate 
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SCREEN 4 [DIFFERENT ACROSS CONDITIONS] 
[Overpaid and Underpaid Conditions] 
Compensation 
The owner will pay you a base salary for doing this job. Although you have 
the same level of work experience, educational background, job description and 
workload, your salaries are NOT the same. Your total compensation in each period 
may be greater than, equal to, or less than your base salary based on the decisions 
made by both you and the other manager.  
You can use the following form to calculate your compensation: 
a. Base Salary1    =  Lira 
       




Requested amount of 




       
c. Your potential 
reporting compensation 
(if you report the other 
manager’s overstatement 
to the owner) 
 
The other manager's 
overstatement 
× 0.2 = 
 Lira 
       
d. Your potential 
overstatement penalty (if 
you are reported by the 
other manager) 
 Your overstatement  × 0.2 = 
 Lira 
       
e. Total Lira  
a + b + c - d 
 = 
 Lira 
       
f. Compensation ($1.00 
for each 100 Lira) 






Note that if you falsely accuse the other manager of overstating his/her funding needs 
when in fact he/she did not, you will receive no payment in that period. 
1. You will be informed of your and the other manager’s base salaries later. 
2. Overstatement is different from overstatement compensation. Your (The other manager’s) 
overstatement exists if you (he/she) overstate your (his/her) funding needs. However, your 
overstatement compensation is the amount of Lira you can get as additional compensation 
by overstating. You can only get your overstatement compensation if you are not reported by 
the other manager. 
 
SCREEN 4 [DIFFERENT ACROSS CONDITIONS] 
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 [Equitably Paid condition] 
Compensation 
The owner will pay you a base salary for doing this job. Since you have the 
same level of work experience, educational background, job description and 
workload, your salaries are the same. Your base salary is 600 Lira, and the base salary 
of the other manager is 600 Lira. Your total compensation in each period may be 
greater than, equal to, or less than your base salary based on the decisions made by 
both you and the other manager.   
You can use the following form to calculate your compensation: 
a. Base Salary    =  Lira 
       




Requested amount of 




       
c. Your potential 
reporting compensation 
(if you report the other 
manager’s overstatement 
to the owner) 
 
The other manager's 
overstatement 
× 0.2 = 
 Lira 
       
d. Your potential 
overstatement penalty (if 
you are reported by the 
other manager) 
 Your overstatement  × 0.2 = 
 Lira 
       
e. Total Lira  
a + b + c - d 
 = 
 Lira 
       
f. Compensation ($1.00 
for each 100 Lira) 






Note that if you falsely accuse the other manager of overstating his/her funding needs 
when in fact he/she did not, you will receive no payment in that period. 
1. Overstatement is different from overstatement compensation. Your (The other manager’s) 
overstatement exists if you (he/she) overstate your (his/her) funding needs. However, your 
overstatement compensation is the amount of Lira you can get as additional compensation 
by overstating. You can only get your overstatement compensation if you are not reported by 































 [Overpaid and Underpaid Conditions] 
Here are some examples that will help you to understand how to calculate your 
compensation.  
Case 1. In the current period, assume the actual amount of funding your division 
(Division A) needs is 3,300 Lira and the actual amount of funding Division B needs is 
3,350 Lira. Assume your Base Salary is 800 Lira. Assume you requested 3,800 Lira 
from the owner, and the manager of Division B requested 3,850 Lira from the owner. 
If you informed the owner that the manager of Division B overstated and if the 
manager of Division B informed the owner that you did not overstate, how much Lira 
can you get? 
 
1. Your overstatement compensation  
= Your Requested amount of funding - Your actual funding needs  
= 3,800 - 3,300 Lira  
= 500 Lira 
<Since in this case, you are not reported by Division B's manager, you can keep 
this potential overstatement compensation> 
 
2. Your reporting compensation  
= The other manager's overstatement × 0.2  
= (3,850 - 3,350) × 0.2  
= 100 Lira 
<Because you inform the owner of the other manager's overstatement, so you 
receive this compensation> 
 
3. Your overstatement penalty  
= 0 Lira 
<In this case, you are not reported by the other manager, so no penalty charge> 
 
4. Total Lira you can earn  
= Base salary + Your overstatement compensation + Your reporting 
compensation - Your overstatement penalty  
= 800 + 500 + 100 - 0 = 1,400 Lira 
 
 
What if your base salary is 400 Lira? How much Lira can you get? 
5. Total Lira you can earn = Base salary + Your potential overstatement 
compensation + Your potential reporting compensation - Your potential 
overstatement penalty  




[Equitably Paid Condition] 
Here are some examples that will help you to understand how to calculate your 
compensation.  
Case 1. In the current period, assume the actual amount of funding your division 
(Division A) needs is 3,300 Lira and the actual amount of funding Division B needs is 
3,350 Lira. Assume your Base Salary is 600 Lira. Assume you requested 3,800 Lira 
from the owner, and the manager of Division B requested 3,850 Lira from the owner. 
If you informed the owner that the manager of Division B overstated and if the 
manager of Division B informed the owner that you did not overstate, how much Lira 
can you get? 
 
1. Your overstatement compensation  
= Your Requested amount of funding - Your actual funding needs  
= 3,800 - 3,300 Lira  
= 500 Lira 
<Since in this case, you are not reported by Division B's manager, you can keep 
this potential overstatement compensation> 
 
2. Your reporting compensation  
= The other manager's overstatement × 0.2  
= (3,850 - 3,350) × 0.2  
= 100 Lira 
< Because you inform the owner of the other manager's overstatement, so you 
receive this compensation> 
 
3. Your overstatement penalty  
= 0 Lira 
<In this case, you are not reported by the other manager, so no penalty charge> 
 
4. Total Lira you can earn = Base salary + Your overstatement compensation + 
Your reporting compensation - Your overstatement penalty  
= 600 + 500 + 100 - 0  











 [Overpaid and Underpaid Conditions] 
Please answer the following questions to assess your understanding of the 
compensation. 
Case 2. In the current period, assume the actual amount of funding your division 
(Division A) needs is 3,300 Lira and the actual amount of funding Division B needs is 
3,350 Lira. Assume your Base Salary is 800 Lira. Assume you requested 3,800 Lira 
from the owner, and the manager of Division B requested 3,850 Lira from the owner. 
If you informed the owner that the manager of Division B did not overstate and if the 
manager of Division B informed the owner that you overstated, how much Lira can 
you get? 
 
1. Your overstatement compensation  
=  
[Correct Answer: 0 Lira] 
 
2. Your reporting compensation  
=  
[Correct Answer: 0 Lira] 
 
3. Your overstatement penalty  
=  
[Correct Answer: 100 Lira] 
 
4. Total Lira you can earn  
= Base salary + Your overstatement compensation + Your reporting 
compensation - Your overstatement penalty 
= 
[Correct Answer: 700 Lira] 
 
 
What if your base salary is 400 Lira? How much Lira can you get? 
5. Total Lira you can earn  
= Base salary + Your overstatement compensation + Your reporting 
compensation - Your overstatement penalty 
= 






[Equitably Paid Condition] 
Please answer the following questions to assess your understanding of the 
compensation. 
Case 2. In the current period, assume the actual amount of funding your division 
(Division A) needs is 3,300 Lira and the actual amount of funding Division B needs is 
3,350 Lira. Assume your Base Salary is 600 Lira. Assume you requested 3,800 Lira 
from the owner, and the manager of Division B requested 3,850 Lira from the owner. 
If you informed the owner that the manager of Division B did not overstate and if the 
manager of Division B informed the owner that you overstated, how much Lira can 
you get? 
 
1. Your overstatement compensation  
=  
[Correct Answer: 0 Lira] 
 
2. Your reporting compensation 
 =  
[Correct Answer: 0 Lira] 
 
3. Your overstatement penalty (if you are reported by Division B's manager)  
=  
[Correct Answer: 100 Lira] 
 
4. Total Lira you can earn  
= 














Now the owner has decided your and the other manager’s base salary! 
Although you have the same level of work experience, educational 
background, job description and workload, your salaries are not the same. Your 
base salary is 800 Lira, and the base salary of the other manager is 400 Lira. 
That is, your base salary is twice as high as the other manager’s base salary. 
Your total compensation in each period may be greater than, equal to, or less than 
your base salary based on the decisions made by both your and the other manager. 
 
[Underpaid Condition] 
Now the owner has decided your and the other manager’s base salary! 
Although you have the same level of work experience, educational 
background, job description and workload, your salaries are not the same. Your 
base salary is 400 Lira, and the base salary of the other manager is 800 Lira. 
That is, your base salary is only half of the other manager's base salary. Your 
total compensation in each period may be greater than, equal to, or less than your base 















Please answer the following questions based on what you were told and/or read 
during the study. All information will be kept confidential. 
1. Each period, I could ask for any amount of funding between my actual funding 
needs and 4,000 Lira (in increments of 50 Lira) from the owner. 
                                                       Yes                                                      No 
[Correct answer: Yes] 
 
2. The other manager and I work for the same company (Beta Company). 
                                                       Yes                                                      No 
[Correct answer: Yes] 
 
3. My base salary is higher than the base salary of the other manager. 
                                                       Yes                                                      No 
[Correct answer in the overpaid condition: Yes] 
[Correct answer in the underpaid and the equitably paid conditions: No] 
 
4. Each period, I knew the actual amount of funding needed by my division 
(Division A) to produce 500 units of parts. 
                                                       Yes                                                      No 
[Correct answer: Yes] 
 
5. Each period, the actual amount of funding needed by my division (Division A) 
and the other division is very similar. 
                                                       Yes                                                      No 
[Correct answer: Yes] 
 
6. If I falsely accuse the other manager of overstating, I can keep my base salary. 
                                                       Yes                                                      No 
[Correct answer: No] 
 
7. The owner would never know my funding needs if the other manager does not 
report on me. 
                                                       Yes                                                      No 
[Correct answer: Yes] 
 
8. I can keep the amount of funding I overstated if the other manager does not 
report on me. 
                                                       Yes                                                      No 






9. I can get a reporting reward if I think the other manager overstated his/her 
funding needs and I report it to the owner. 
                                                       Yes                                                      No 
[Correct answer: Yes] 
 
10. Even if I am pretty sure the other manager overstated his/her funding needs, I 
can choose not to inform the owner of the overstatement. 
                                                       Yes                                                      No 














 [Overpaid Condition] 
Summary 
1. The owner will pay you a base salary for doing this job. Although you have 
the same level of work experience, educational background, job 
description and workload, your salaries are NOT the same. Your base 
salary is 800 Lira, and the base salary of the other manager is 400 Lira. That 
is, your base salary is twice as high as the other manager's base salary. 
Your total compensation in each period may be greater than, equal to, or less 
than your base salary based on the decisions made by both you and the other 
manager.  
2. Your private forecasting system will tell you the actual amount of funding 
your division needs to produce 500 units of parts. However, the owner only 
knows that your funding needs are between 3,000 Lira and 4,000 Lira, in 
increments of 50 Lira. 
3. You can request any amount of funding between your actual funding needs 
and 4,000 Lira from the owner. 
4. Since the other division is producing 500 units of the same part in each period, 
the other division's funding needs will be very similar to your funding needs. 
5. If you find that the other manager of Division B overstated his/her funding 
needs, you can choose whether to inform the owner or not by choosing one of 
the two choices on the Peer Reporting Form. Note that although you may be 
fairly sure whether the manager of Division B overstated his/her funding 
needs or not, you can either choose "Overstated" or "Not Overstated," 
regardless of what you think the manager of Division B actually did. 
6. You will have one practice round to help you better understand these 
instructions. 
7. When a new period starts, the amount of funding each division needs may 
change. In the new period, you and a new manager from another division of 
Beta Company will produce 500 units of other parts individually. 
8. Your cash payment will be determined by a randomly selected period. Your 









1. The owner will pay you a base salary for doing this job. Although you have 
the same level of work experience, educational background, job 
description and workload, your salaries are NOT the same. Your base 
salary is 400 Lira, and the base salary of the other manager is 800 Lira. That 
is, your base salary is only half of the other manager's base salary. Your 
total compensation in each period may be greater than, equal to, or less than 
your base salary based on the decisions made by both you and the other 
manager.  
2. Your private forecasting system will tell you the actual amount of funding 
your division needs to produce 500 units of parts. However, the owner only 
knows that your funding needs are between 3,000 Lira and 4,000 Lira, in 
increments of 50 Lira. 
3. You can request any amount of funding between your actual funding needs 
and 4,000 Lira from the owner. 
4. Since the other division is producing 500 units of the same part in each period, 
the other division's funding needs will be very similar to your funding needs. 
5. If you find that the other manager of Division B overstated his/her funding 
needs, you can choose whether to inform the owner or not by choosing one of 
the two choices on the Peer Reporting Form. Note that although you may be 
fairly sure whether the manager of Division B overstated his/her funding 
needs or not, you can either choose "Overstated" or "Not Overstated," 
regardless of what you think the manager of Division B actually did. 
6. You will have one practice round to help you better understand these 
instructions. 
7. When a new period starts, the amount of funding each division needs may 
change. In the new period, you and a new manager from another division of 
Beta Company will produce 500 units of other parts individually. 
8. Your cash payment will be determined by a randomly selected period. Your 







 [Equitably Paid Condition] 
Summary 
1. The owner will pay you a base salary for doing this job. Since you have the 
same level of work experience, educational background, job description 
and workload, your salaries are the same. Your base salary is 600 Lira, and 
the base salary of the other manager is 600 Lira. Your total compensation in 
each period may be greater than, equal to, or less than your base salary based 
on the decisions made by both you and the other manager.  
2. Your private forecasting system will tell you the actual amount of funding 
your division needs to produce 500 units of parts. However, the owner only 
knows that your funding needs are between 3,000 Lira and 4,000 Lira, in 
increments of 50 Lira. 
3. You can request any amount of funding between your actual funding needs 
and 4,000 Lira from the owner. 
4. Since the other division is producing 500 units of the same part in each period, 
the other division's funding needs will be very similar to your funding needs. 
5. If you find that the other manager of Division B overstated his/her funding 
needs, you can choose whether to inform the owner or not by choosing one of 
the two choices on the Peer Reporting Form. Note that although you may be 
fairly sure whether the manager of Division B overstated his/her funding 
needs or not, you can either choose "Overstated" or "Not Overstated," 
regardless of what you think the manager of Division B actually did. 
6. You will have one practice round to help you better understand these 
instructions. 
7. When a new period starts, the amount of funding each division needs may 
change. In the new period, you and a new manager from another division of 
Beta Company will produce 500 units of other parts individually. 
8. Your cash payment will be determined by a randomly selected period. Your 
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PRIVATE FORECASTING INFORMATION FORM 
 
Manager ID: _____________________________________ 
 
My Base Salary: __________________________________ 
 




The total amount of funding needed to produce 500 units of Part X for your division 





BETA COMPANY DIVISION A FUNDING REQUEST FORM
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BETA COMPANY DIVISION A FUNDING REQUEST FORM 
 
Manager ID: _____________________________________ 
 
My Base Salary: __________________________________  
 




The total amount of funding I am requesting to produce 500 units of Part X is (please 
choose): 
o 3,000 Lira 
o 3,050 Lira 
o 3,100 Lira 
o 3,150 Lira 
o 3,200 Lira 
o 3,250 Lira 
o 3,300 Lira 
o 3,350 Lira 
o 3,400 Lira 
o 3,450 Lira 
o 3,500 Lira 
o 3,550 Lira 
o 3,600 Lira 
o 3,650 Lira 
o 3,700 Lira 
o 3,750 Lira 
o 3,800 Lira 
o 3,850 Lira 
o 3,900 Lira 






BETA COMPANY DIVISION B FUNDING REQUEST FORM
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BETA COMPANY DIVISION B FUNDING REQUEST FORM 
 
Manager ID: _____________________________________ 
 
My Base Salary: __________________________________  
 













PEER REPORTING FORM 
 
Manager ID: _____________________________________ 
 
My Base Salary: __________________________________  
 




What report would you like to make regarding the amount of funding Division B 
requested (Please choose)? 








Please rate your degree of agreement with the following statements. All 
information will be kept confidential. 
 
1. Compared to the amount of base salary received by the other manager, my 
base salary was 
A. Higher                          B. the same                           C. lower 
 
2. The amount of base salary I received was fair. [Absolute fairness perception1] 













3. How fair did you think your base salary was compared to the base salary of 
the other manager? [Relative fairness perception] 












Fair It was 
very fair 
 
4. Considering the effort I put into my work, my base salary was fair. [Absolute  
fairness perception3] 













5. People on the same job should be paid equally.  


















6. I am satisfied with my base salary. [Absolute pay satisfaction1] 













7. I am satisfied with my base salary compared to that of the other manager. 
[Relative pay satisfaction] 













8. Considering the effort I put into my work, I am satisfied with my base salary. 
[Absolute pay satisfaction3] 













9. In different periods, I was matched with managers from different divisions. 
                           Yes                                                      No 
 
10. I think overstating the amount of funding my division needs is unethical. 













11. When making decisions, I considered how my decisions would affect my final 
payment. 
                           Yes                                                      No 
 
12. When making decisions, I considered how my decisions would affect Beta 
Company’s overall profit. 




13. During the study, did you ever NOT inform the owner that the other manager 
had overstated the amount of funding he/she needed? 
                           Yes                                                      No 
If “Yes”, why did you NOT inform the owner that the other manager had 
overstated his/her budget (you can choose more than one item)? 
□ I felt sorry for the other manager because of his/her low base salary. 
□ I was not sure if the other manager overstated or not. 
□ The amount of funding the other manger overstated is not very much. 
□ I did not inform the owner because I thought the other manager would act 
the same for me. 
□ I did not care. 
□ I just don’t want to report others. 
Other reason: ___________________________________________________ 
 
14. During the study, did you ever inform the owner that the other manager had 
overstated the amount of funding he/she needed? 
                           Yes                                                      No 
If “Yes”, why did you inform the owner that the other manager had overstated 
his/her budget (you can choose more than one item)? 
□ I wanted to get the reporting reward. 
□ It is the right thing to do. 
□ The other manager overstated too much. 
□ The other manager overstated more than I did. 
□ Overstating funding needs is not ethical. 
□ If I did not choose to tell the owner, the company will lose money. 















For each of the following statements, please indicate your degree of agreement 
with the following statements. There is no right or wrong answers. All 
information will be kept confidential. 
 
17. It annoys me when other people perform better than I do. [Vertical 
individualism1] 













18. Competition is the law of nature. [Vertical individualism2] 













19. When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused. [Vertical 
individualism3] 
















20. Without competition, it is not possible to have a good society. [Vertical 
individualism4] 













21. Winning is everything. [Vertical individualism5] 













22. It is important that I do my job better than others. [Vertical individualism6] 













23. I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others. [Vertical 
individualism7] 













24. Some people emphasize winning; I’m not one of them. [Vertical 
individualism8] 













25. The well-being of my co-workers is important to me. [Horizontal 
collectivism1] 















26. If a co-worker gets a prize, I would feel proud. [Horizontal collectivism2] 













27. If a relative were in financial difficulty, I would help within my means. 
[Horizontal collectivism3] 













28. It is important to maintain harmony within my group. [Horizontal 
collectivism4] 













29. I like sharing little things with my neighbors. [Horizontal collectivism5] 













30. I feel good when I cooperate with others. [Horizontal collectivism6] 













31. My happiness depends very much on the happiness of those around me. 
[Horizontal collectivism7] 
















32. To me, pleasure is spending time with others. [Horizontal collectivism8] 













33. I do not feel comfortable about taking chances. [Risk aversion1]. 













34. I prefer situations that have foreseeable outcomes. [Risk aversion2]. 













35. Before I make a decision, I like to be absolutely sure how things will turn out. 
[Risk aversion3]. 













36. I avoid situations that have uncertain outcomes. [Risk aversion4]. 













37. I feel comfortable improvising in new situations. [Risk aversion5]. 
















38. I feel nervous when I have to make decisions in uncertain situations. [Risk 
aversion6]. 













39. A person should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm 
another even to a small degree. [Idealism1] 













40. Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks 
might be. [Idealism2] 













41. The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the 
benefits to be gained. [Idealism3] 













42. One should never psychologically or physically harm another person. 
[Idealism4] 

















43. One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the dignity 
and welfare of another individual. [Idealism5] 













44. If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done. 
[Idealism6] 













45. Deciding whether or not to perform an act by balancing the positive 
consequences of the act against the negative consequences of the act is 
immoral. [Idealism7] 













46. The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in 
any society. [Idealism8] 













47. It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others. [Idealism9] 

















48. Moral actions are those which closely match ideals of the most “perfect” 
action. [Idealism10] 













Please answer the following questions. If not applicable, please indicate as 
“N/A”. All information will be kept confidential. 
 
49. Gender (Male or Female): __________       Other: Please specify __________ 
 
50. Age: ______  
 
51. Race (circle one): 
 
White             Black           Hispanic           Asian     
Other: Please specify ______________________________ 
 
52. What is your current class level?  
Freshman                Sophomore                    Junior                       Senior 
  Masters student       Ph.D. student                Other: Please specify __________ 
 
53. GMAT score ____________                          SAT or ACT score ___________ 
 
54. Overall Undergraduate GPA: __________      
 
55. Overall Graduate GPA: __________  
 
56. Your Undergraduate Degree Major (Concentration): __________________ 
 
57. Your Graduate Degree Major (Concentration): ______________________ 
 
58. How many months of paid internship work experience do you have? _______ 
 
59. How many months of full-time work experience do you have? ________ 
 
60. When you signed up to participate in today’s study, what is the approximate 










(Singelis et al. 1995) 
All items are measured using a 7-point Likert-type response format anchored 
at 1 = Strongly disagree and 7 = Strongly agree. 
VI1. It annoys me when other people perform better than I do.  
VI2. Competition is the law of nature.  
VI3. When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused.  
VI4. Without competition, it is not possible to have a good society.  
VI5. Winning is everything.  
VI6. It is important that I do my job better than others.  
VI7. I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others.  







(Singelis et al. 1995) 
All items are measured using a 7-point Likert-type response format anchored 
at 1 = Strongly disagree and 7 = Strongly agree. 
HC1. The well-being of my co-workers is important to me.  
HC2. If a co-worker gets a prize, I would feel proud.  
HC3. If a relative were in financial difficulty, I would help within my means.  
HC4. It is important to maintain harmony within my group.  
HC5. I like sharing little things with my neighbors.  
HC6. I feel good when I cooperate with others.  
HC7. My happiness depends very much on the happiness of those around me.  





(Mandrik and Bao’s 2005) 
All items are measured using a 7-point Likert-type response format anchored 
at 1 = Strongly disagree and 7 = Strongly agree. 
RC1. I do not feel comfortable about taking chances.  
RC2. I prefer situations that have foreseeable outcomes.  
RC3Before I make a decision, I like to be absolutely sure how things will 
turn out.  
RC4. I avoid situations that have uncertain outcomes.  
RC5. I feel comfortable improvising in new situations [R].  








All items are measured using a 7-point Likert-type response format anchored 
at 1 = Strongly disagree and 7 = Strongly agree. 
I1.A person should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm 
another even to a small degree.  
I2. Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the 
risks might be.  
I3. The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of 
the benefits to be gained.  
I4. One should never psychologically or physically harm another person.  
I5. One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the 
dignity and welfare of another individual.  
I6. If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done.  
I7. Deciding whether or not to perform an act by balancing the positive 
consequences of the act against the negative consequences of the act is 
immoral.  
I8. The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in 
any society.  
I9. It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others.  
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Table 31: Summary of Hypotheses Tests 
Panel A: H1a & H1b  
 
Table Description Support 
Table 3  The effect of horizontal inequity on budget slack - 
descriptive statistics 
Yes 
Table 4  The effect of horizontal inequity on budget slack - ANOVA  Yes 
Table 5 
(Panel A) 
The effect of horizontal inequity on budget slack - linear 









The effect of horizontal inequity on budget slack - gender 
effect 
Yes 
Table 7  The effect of horizontal inequity on percentage of honesty - 
descriptive statistics 
Yes 





The effect of horizontal inequity on percentage of honesty - 









The effect of horizontal inequity on percentage of honesty - 
gender effect 
Yes 
Table 26 The effect of horizontal inequity on total budget slack - 
ANCOVA  
No 




Panel B: H2a 
 
Table Description Support 
Table 9       The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing 
percentage - descriptive statistics                                                         
Yes 
Table 10     The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing 
percentage - ANOVA 
Yes 
Table 11     The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing 
percentage - repeated ANOVA 
Yes 
Table 12     The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing 
percentage - contrast model 
No 
Table 13     The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing 
decision - cross-tab analysis 
No 
Table 19     The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing 





Table 31: (Continued) 
 
Table 28     The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing decision - 
ANCOVA 
Yes 
Table 29     The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing decision - 
ANCOVA (when peer overstatement is not severe) 
No 
Table 30     The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing decision - 
ANCOVA (when peer overstatement is severe) 
Yes 
 
Panel C: H2b 
 
Table Description Support 
Table 9  The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing 
percentage - descriptive statistics 
No 
Table 10  The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing 
percentage - ANOVA 
No 
Table 11  The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing 
percentage - repeated ANOVA 
No 
Table 12  The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing 
percentage - contrast model 
No 
Table 13  The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing 
percentage - cross-tab analysis 
No 
Table 19 The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing 
percentage - gender effect 
No 
Table 28  The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing decision 
- ANCOVA 
Yes 
Table 29           The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing decision 
- ANCOVA when peer overstatement is NOT severe 
No 
Table 30  The effect of horizontal inequity on whistleblowing decision 
- ANCOVA when peer overstatement is severe 
Yes 
 
Panel D: H3a 
 
Table Description Support 
Table 3  The effect of capacity for budget slack on budget slack - 
descriptive statistics 
Yes 





The effect of capacity for budget slack on budget slack - 




The effect of capacity for budget slack on budget slack – 
gender effect 
Yes 
Table 7  The effect of capacity for budget slack on percentage of 






Table 31: (Continued) 
 
Table 8  The effect of capacity for budget slack on percentage of 
honesty - ANOVA  
No 
Table 5 
(Panel B)  
The effect of capacity for budget slack on percentage of 




The effect of capacity for budget slack on percentage of 
honesty - gender effect 
Yes 
 
Panel E: H3b 
 
Table Description Support 
Table 9  The effect of severity of peer overstatement on 
whistleblowing percentage - descriptive statistics 
Yes 
Table 10  The effect of severity of peer overstatement on 
whistleblowing percentage - ANOVA  
Yes 
Table 11  The effect of severity of peer overstatement on 




The effect of severity of peer overstatement on 
whistleblowing decision - cross- tab analysis 
Yes 
Table 28  The effect of severity of peer overstatement on 
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